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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the nature of Bulgarian national security and how it is 
supported by Bulgarian Special Operations Forces (BSOF). It examines the changing 
global security environment and its implications on Bulgarian security challenges in the 
21st Century.  In particular, the global war on terror and the newly acquired NATO 
membership have posed new challenges for the Bulgarian Armed Forces, including 
BSOF. This thesis explores Bulgarian security strategy and NATO requirements for 
special operations, and analyzes how each of these may be satisfied, in part, by BSOF.  
The shortfalls between Bulgarian and NATO needs and BSOF’s current capabilities 
suggest that BSOF should be unified under a single joint Special Operations Command 
directly subordinated to the highest commanding headquarters of the Bulgarian Armed 
Forces. Moreover, BSOF should be provided with an independent funding program with 
dedicated air and maritime assets for strategic support, and with advanced SOF--specific 
equipment.  
This study suggests the necessity for reorganization and improvement of BSOF in 
response to the requirements of national security and NATO Special Operations 
requirements.  It posits that a restructuring and enhancement of BSOF is likely to 
strengthen Bulgarian national security, as well as contributing to an improvement in the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
An analysis of Bulgarian national security in the context of official civilian and 
military documents found that asymmetric threats such as terrorism, the transportation of 
nuclear materials and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the resurgence of radical 
Islamism, and low intensity conflicts in close proximity to the state are the most probable 
security risks for Bulgaria in the 21st century (Annual National Security Report, 2006). 
Furthermore, the same documents indirectly implied that Bulgarian Special Operations 
Forces (BSOF) are the principal military asset capable of addressing these contemporary 
threats. In addition to this implication, the Bulgarian Concept for Establishment, 
Development, and Employment of Special Operations Forces (CEDESOF) directly 
assigns BSOF to missions which, to a considerable extent, anticipate the aforementioned 
security risks. In general, BSOF should be a rapid-reaction and flexible military asset 
capable of providing a low or high-profile response in the interest of national or allied 
security without involving other Bulgarian Armed Forces.  
As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Bulgaria’s 
Armed Forces, particularly BSOF, should be ready to respond to all challenges that 
threaten the allied nations. The integration of the Bulgarian military into NATO can only 
be successful through the achievement of full interoperability with other nation’s forces, 
which include a collective NATO SOF (NSOF). Presently, BSOF is less likely to 
properly address the latter expectations. The analysis in this thesis of the organization, 
employment, and management of BSOF provides several reasons for its inability to be a 
reliable guardian for Bulgarian national security. The subordination of Bulgarian Special 
Forces to the armed services of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, the lack of a unified Special 
Operations Command with organic projection assets, and the inadequate funding for 
these forces are the factors which prevent BSOF from being a viable rapid-reaction 
military asset. Moreover, the historical experience of the United States Special 
Operations Forces (USSOF), the analysis of the latest U.S. and NATO Special 
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Operations doctrine, and the trends for future management of SOF worldwide prove that 
BSOF is inappropriately organized, managed, and employed.  
Being assigned as a major military force in support of Bulgarian national security, 
BSOF is expected to carry out crucially important and complex missions within Bulgaria 
and abroad. This can only be achieved if BSOF is properly reorganized, managed, 
equipped, and employed. The conclusions of this thesis recommend that Bulgarian 
Special Forces should be unified under a single joint command directly subordinated to 
the highest Bulgarian military authority responsible for strategic planning – the General 
Staff. This proposed command should be provided with organic aerial and maritime 
assets for strategic projection and with an independent funding program. Through these 
changes, not only will BSOF address the major requirements for NSOF, but it will also 
become a significant military asset for Bulgarian national and global security.  
B. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The basic analytical method used by the author in this study is the systems 
analysis approach. “Systems analysis is the science dealing with analysis of complex, 
large scale systems and the interactions within those systems” (Wikipedia, 2006). The 
method examines “. . . the role of a proposed system and the identification of the 
requirements that it should meet.  It is the starting point for system design.  [Through 
detailed analysis,] the system’s analysts are responsible for identifying requirements and 
producing a design” (Free-On Line Dictionary Of Computing, 1996).   
This thesis analyzes Bulgarian national security by identifying the requirements it 
imposes upon military and law-enforcement agencies, particularly BSOF.  Discussing the 
organization, management, and employment of BSOF, the author outlines its present 
capabilities. Finally, after the discovered shortfalls between the requirements of the 
national security and the current capabilities of BSOF have been examined, 
recommendations for future reorganization and development of BSOF are proposed.  The 
suggested improvements address all documented shortfalls.  
Chapter II of the study begins with the analysis of the Bulgarian security 
environment and the examination of the probable national security risks.  The major 
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source of information in Chapter II is the Bulgarian National Security Concept (NSC) 
and the Annual National Security Report (ANSR) for 2005.   
In Chapter III, the author analyzes the Bulgarian National Security Strategy with 
its domestic and foreign priorities as detailed in the government documents studied in 
Chapter II. The trends in the national security policy are clarified by Vayrynen’s theory 
for small states and the changing global environment. The Bulgarian Military Strategy 
(MS) is the next major topic of interest for Chapter III; it is supported by the Bulgarian 
Military Doctrine (MD) and by the military section in the ANSR. The thesis outlines 
present and future trends in Bulgarian military policy in the context of contemporary 
internal security concerns and external NATO membership requirements.  
After outlining basic military doctrinal standards, the author analyzes the role of 
BSOF in both national and military strategies in Chapter IV.  Based on the NSC, ANSR, 
MS, MD, and CEDESOF, the thesis reveals how BSOF could be better employed in the 
interest of Bulgarian national security. The conclusions are based on Taillon’s 
counterterrorism theory and Cohen’s findings on special forces.  
Chapter V deals with the prospects for the development of NATO SOF, as 
outlined in the studies of Binnendijk, Gompert, and Kugler, Gompert, and Smith.  
Further, the author discusses allied standards for special operations based on the 
information found in the Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP-01 (B)).  This discussion sets the 
stage for Chapter VI.    
Chapter VI identifies and analyzes the shortfalls between the requirements of 
Bulgarian national security, NATO standards, and the capabilities of BSOF. The 
assessment of the problem is supported by examples of the historical experiences of U.S. 
SOF provided by authors like Vandenbrucke, Cohen, Adams, and Marquis. The U.S. 
Doctrine for Joint Special Operations--Joint Publication 3-05--is a useful and credible 
source for sustaining the principles for special operations outlined in AJP-01 (B). 
Alternatively, the Bulgarian CEDESOF reveals the doctrinal limitations of Bulgarian 
Special Operations policy.  Some of the bureaucratic phenomena of the Bulgarian Armed 
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Forces are explained using the organizational theories of Mintzberg, Bolman and Deal, as 
well as Allison’s organizational behavior model.  
In conclusion, Chapter VII wraps up the analysis and provides recommendations 
to the Bulgarian politico-military leadership for the essential transformation of BSOF in 
response to the identified shortfalls. The study ends with the prospects for the future 
development of BSOF and the necessity for further studies on the problem that consider 
the significance of special operations and BSOF for Bulgarian national and global 
security.  
C. BACKGROUND 
Bulgaria has not responded fully to the new threats of the 21Pst P century. This is 
particularly true with regards to the development of a special operations capability. After 
September 11Pth P, 2001, the global security environment changed considerably. Although 
smaller nations like Bulgaria are probably less affected by the change, they still share the 
burden of contemporary asymmetric threats. At the same time, the Bulgarian leadership 
has recognized the need for full integration of the state into global political and military 
organizations such as NATO and the European Union (EU).  Small states are more 
concerned for their security and, therefore, are willing to join global economic or military 
organizations. Becoming part of such unions defines the political orientation of Bulgaria; 
it shares the values of the member states and anticipates the same security risks. The 
participation of the country in NATO and the EU poses new political, economic, and 
military challenges for its leadership. Consequently, Bulgarian authorities align national 
legislation and reform the armed forces in accordance with the potential security threats 
for the state and the integration requirements of NATO. Based on the Bulgarian NSC,  
MS, and MD, the Long-Тerm Vision for the Development of the Armed Forces 
(LTVDAF) outlines the major framework for military transformation of the Bulgarian 
Armed Forces. Demonstrating readiness to support allied operations abroad, Bulgaria has 
deployed its forces in various countries, including Afghanistan and Iraq. Anticipating 




well organized, trained, and equipped. All these requirements are even more important 
for BSOF, especially in a security environment dominated by asymmetric and irregular 
threats.  
In 2000, the Bulgarian military leadership approved a new concept for Special 
Operations – CEDESOF. With some exceptions, the document is in general accord with 
the trends of the development of SOF of Western countries. Although CEDESOF defines 
BSOF as the most important military asset in response to the risks for Bulgarian national 
security, the organization is limited by military bureaucratic arrangements that negatively 
affect its operational capabilities. With the CEDESOF, Bulgarian military authorities 
tried to modernize BSOF, but after five years it became obvious that the concept is 
limited and the special operations policy of the national politico-military leadership is 
insufficient.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
This study is based on the information provided by the aforementioned official 
Bulgarian concepts, strategies, and doctrine. Almost all of the sources, except ANSR, 
date from 1998 and were amended in 2002.  Some of the documents, such as the 
LTVDBAF, are classified.  Therefore, the analyses in this thesis are relatively limited by 
the lack of updated information on Bulgarian national security and military strategy as 
well as the role of BSOF in these strategies. Moreover, a new Bulgarian National 
Security Strategy is expected to be developed in 2007. Such a document will require 
updating and the synchronization with all dependent political and military documents 
related to national security, including CEDESOF.  
In 2007, the Bulgarian military leadership is expected to release a new Doctrine 
for Special Operations.  Furthermore, the membership of Bulgaria in NATO and the EU 
will impose a number of strict requirements for the armed forces and the national law-
enforcement agencies. NATO authorities are also working on the development of a new 
Doctrine for Special Operations – Allied Joint Publication 3.5. Therefore, the anticipated 
changes in future Bulgarian security and military policy could diminish the relevance of 
this study. However, considering the lack of discussions on the issues related to BSOF in 
Bulgarian politico-military circles, this thesis constitutes an academic basis for further 
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analytical debates. It is the hope of the author that this study will assist in the 

























II. BULGARIAN SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF BULGARIA 
Bulgaria is one of the oldest European states. Its territories lie in the Balkan 
Peninsula and its borders have been altered many times. The native population is a 
mixture of local Slavic and Bulgarian tribes who have long traditions living close to the 
Volga and Cama Rivers. In the seventh century the Bulgarian tribes moved to the Balkan 
Peninsula by crossing the Danube River from the north. The Slavs and the Bulgarians 
made an alliance and signed their first peace treaty in 681 A.D., which is considered the 
year of the establishment of the Bulgarian state. Though of a clan minority, the Bulgarian 
aristocracy became the state-forming element and enjoyed a political dominance over the 
Slavic majority.  Soon after state formation, however, the Bulgarians were culturally 
assimilated by the Slavs, which formed a unified socio-political national entity.  
The period between 681 A.D. and 1018 A.D. comprised the First Bulgarian 
Kingdom. The newly founded Bulgarian state managed to preserve its independence by 
defeating, on several occasions, the armies of the Byzantium Empire, the Crusaders, and 
numerous barbarian tribes. In 865 A.D., the Bulgarians converted to Christianity.  It was 
an important moment that would lead to an official recognition of the state as tsardom by 
the Pope and the Holy Roman Empire.  The Bulgarian Prince Simeon was crowned the 
tsar of all Bulgarians. At the same time, the Bulgarian state developed its first alphabet 
and all official documents were translated into the old Bulgarian language. This alphabet 
today is known as the Cyrillic script, and it is used by several states in Eastern Europe. It 
had a major impact on the administrative and cultural development of the state, and more 
importantly, on the Bulgarian independence from the Byzantium influence. In 1018 A.D., 
the Byzantine Emperor conquered the Bulgarian state and made it a subjugated province.  
After a successful uprising in 1185 A.D., Bulgaria earned back its freedom; this 
was the beginning of the Second Bulgarian Kingdom (1185 A.D. to 1396 A.D.), which 
lasted for almost two centuries. The end of the period was marked by controversial 
disputes among the aristocratic families for political dominance and possession of lands. 
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The unhealthy climate within the state facilitated the Ottoman invasion.  From the south, 
the Ottomans invaded in 1396 A.D. and conquered the quarrelling aristocrats. According 
to historical assessments, Bulgaria became a barrier for further Ottoman Muslim 
invasions into Europe during that period.   
Suppressed under the rule of the Sultan, Bulgaria lost its aristocracy, 
administration, church, and the human rights of its population. It was a period of hardship 
and largely a matter of mere survival for the population. All these difficulties formed an 
acute awareness for the preservation of national identity, faith, religious tradition, culture, 
and history. By developing trade, crafts, an educational system, folklore, and maintaining 
religious traditions, the Bulgarians managed to survive for five centuries. Along with the 
cultural, economic, and religious development, the Bulgarian people maintained their 
revolutionary spirit, which in 1876 materialized into an uprising against the Ottoman 
oppression. The bloody response by the Sultan drew the attention of the European society 
and became a major reason for the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78. The Turkish defeat 
led to the liberation of Bulgaria and opened a new page in Bulgarian history.  
The San Stephano Peace Treaty, signed on March 3, 1878, was the official act of 
liberation of the Bulgarian people. According to the treaty, all lands which were inhabited 
by Bulgarians fell within the borders of the independent state of Bulgaria. Yet this 
solution was unfavorable for Britain, France, and Germany; they did not want a large and 
powerful state in the Balkan Peninsula. Their solution tore Bulgaria into three parts, 
which left more than half of the Bulgarian population outside the borders of the state. 
This controversial decision encouraged various politico-military commitments of the 
Bulgarian authorities for unification of the state. Although the Bulgarian Armed Forces 
had not lost a battle on the field, the nation suffered numerous defeats in the diplomatic 
arena.  In 1885, Northern and Southern Bulgaria proclaimed their unification, in spite of 
the protests of the European powers. The dream of a complete national unification was 
injected into the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and World War I and II.  Sadly, however, very 
little was achieved for the Bulgarian national cause. 
At the conclusion of World War II, Bulgaria fell under the Russian sphere of 
influence. During the first four decades of the 20th Century, Bulgaria had begun 
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developing a capitalist-based economy, but the Soviets had other ideas.  The communist 
leadership and the Russian authorities quickly enforced a new economic system based on 
the centralization, industrialization, and nationalization of economic assets. The 
Bulgarian population was deprived of its rights and was controlled by the secret services. 
In the outcome of democratic processes and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria 
opened a new page of its history. After 1989 the state managed to reorganize its politico-
economic system and elected a democratic parliament and established a basis for a 
market economy. The benefits of the process became evident with a general stabilization 
of the economy, the establishment of democratic institutions, and the creation of 
opportunities for the population.  In 2004, Bulgaria became a full NATO member.  In 
2007, the state is expected to be accepted into the European Union (Bulgaria’s History, 
2006). 
B. GEOPOLITICAL CLIMATE AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
1. Balkan Security in the Context of the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia  
Bulgarian national policy evolved as a result of a relatively complex and dynamic 
security environment. The democratic changes in the Balkans still influence regional 
security. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia demonstrates the 
unpredictability of the socio-political changes in an environment of an immature 
democracy (e.g., lack of centralized control and revived nationalism). The war in the 
former Yugoslavia exposed the vulnerability of regional peace and the weaknesses of the 
European institutions as the guardians of security. This failure imposes changes of the 
paradigms for regional security, especially for countries located close to less stable areas. 
Bulgaria is dangerously close to the former Yugoslavia and is indirectly influenced by the 
negative consequences of its recent crises.  For example, ethnic hostilities in the former 
Yugoslavia during the 1990s isolated Bulgaria from Western Europe, halting its 
economic and political development.  The crisis in the Balkans not only delayed politico-
economic processes, but established an unstable and potentially dangerous security 
environment for the neighboring countries (Bulgarian National Security Concept, 1998). 
In accordance with the Annual National Security Report (ANSR) for 2005, despite that 
the region is in a phase of stabilization, the security level of the area is still the lowest in 
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Europe (2006). There are preconditions for ethnic tensions, which combine with the poor 
economic situation, organized crime, corruption, and ineffective administration, to 
aggravate the security environment.   
The latest challenges for peace in the region are the resolution of Kosovo’s status 
and the separation of Montenegro from Serbia. Moreover, the close proximity of states 
which participate in the global war on terror, such as Bulgaria and Romania, to areas with 
dense Muslim populations may inspire radical Islamism and acts of terrorism against both 
countries. Although international initiatives and economic support for the region mitigate 
these probabilities, the western Balkans is still an unstable region (ANSR, 2006).  
2. The Geo-strategic Importance of the Balkans 
The latest developments in the Balkans and the Black Sea region ended the 
traditional Russian influence over the local states, particularly Bulgaria. Bulgarian and 
Romanian admission into NATO in 2004 was the formal outcome of the new geo-
strategic situation in the Balkans. The new politico-military environment in the region 
will certainly have considerable consequences for global politics. The Balkans and the 
Black Sea region have been a stage for geo-political struggles over a long period of time. 
History is a reminder of intense political and military battles among the Russian-
Orthodox world, the Ottoman-Muslim Empire, and the West for control over this 
strategically important region. Most recently, two major international political trends 
have predetermined the dynamics in the Balkans. First, the transition of the local states 
from Russian influence to American guardianship begets antagonism between Germany 
and France, on one side, and the U.S. on the other.  The second deals with energy 
resources.  There is now an established “energy axis” that delivers gas and oil resources 
from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to the Balkans and Western Europe. It is a 
strategic energy root which is an alternative to the Russian pipelines for the European 
Union. Not only will the energy axis diminish the European dependence on Russian 
crude resources, but it will also undermine Moscow’s economic influence in the 
European region. Therefore, Western control over the Balkans and Black Sea region will 
influence the policies of the local states and will affect Russian economic interests in the 
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region. Once again, it appears that Bulgaria’s national security is dependent upon the 
outcome of a struggle amongst the world’s major powers.  Ultimately, the stability of  
Bulgaria is based on two choices: strategic partnership with the USA and NATO 
membership, and economic relations with Western Europe and accession to the European 
Union (Bordonaro, 2005).  
3. The Role of Organized Crime in the Region 
Considering the fact that Bulgaria is a part of the European corridor for strategic 
transport, communications, and energy supplies, the geo-strategic position of the state 
considerably affects both national and European security. Being a natural politico-
economic nerve center, the Balkan Peninsula attracts the interests of not only the U.S. 
and the European Union but, regrettably, of worldwide organized crime groups as well. 
The strategic transport corridors passing through Bulgaria facilitate money laundering, 
and the trafficking of narcotics, arms, and humans, endangering not only Bulgarian 
security, but also many European states (NSC, 1998).  Criminal activities and corruption 
at high levels of administration are a root cause for the gray economy in Bulgaria. 
Being under permanent pressure, organized crime constantly evolves its methods 
of operation, changing basic principles and the means of communication and trafficking. 
Major difficulties for countering the illegal organizations are their sophisticated 
structures, complex relations, and an uncanny ability to disguise as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) or radical groups.  Thus, encouraged by huge profits generated by 
illegal activities, organized crime may use various levers to influence Bulgarian 
institutions. Mafia groups recognize that a weak state is a fertile ground for their illicit 
businesses; therefore, they are interested in the destabilization of the state and halting the 
democratic and economic reforms. In summary, the evolution of organized crime and its 
symbiosis with radical religious groups, slow transformation of law-enforcement 
institutions, weak border control, and insufficient capabilities for maintaining order 
within the state additionally increase the risks for national and regional security (ANSR, 
2006).  
After Bulgaria becomes a member of the EU, it will become a frontier of the 
European economic zone. As a result, the criminal organizations in the region may 
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attempt to halt the admission of Balkan nations, particularly Bulgaria, to the EU. Vice 
versa, after Bulgaria’s accession into the union, by using the weaknesses of the state, 
many interested illegal players may try to establish companies, run businesses, and 
expand their criminal activities to other countries of the union (ANSR, 2006).  
4. The Threat of Terrorism  
Although the probability for a high intensity conflict in the Balkans is low, the 
close proximity to unstable regions such as the Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
North Africa contain risks of possible escalation into Bulgaria. A major concern for 
Bulgarian security remains the threat of terrorism and the transportation or proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The former threat became much more evident 
after September 11th 2001. Terrorism is no longer only a local problem; it is an imminent 
danger for the world community. Terrorist organizations inspired by the success of Al 
Qaeda and exasperated by the international political, economic, and military trends are 
not limited by borders when executing their deadly agendas. Using the latest 
technological innovations, they are able to spread their ideology worldwide and  
influence political decisions of the most powerful states. Terrorists have attempted to 
acquire WMD technology through their own resources and connections (Perl, 2006, p. 4).  
Using these lethal assets, they easily can blackmail governments and cause numerous 
deaths and widespread destruction.  Terrorist groups are highly adaptable to the 
countermeasures used against them by decentralizing their structures and adapting their 
systems of coordination.   
In recent years, the nexus between organized crime and terrorist groups has 
become more evident.  As Raphael Perl (2006) observes, one of the latest trends is “an 
increasing overlap of terrorism activity with organized crime” (p. 2).  Their relations are 
based on the gained mutual benefits through the use of the same networks and the 
combination of their principal motivating factors: monetary gain and profit and radical 
Islamic ideology. It is clear that terrorists and criminals are likely to choose smaller, 
weaker, and politically and economically unstable states for their operational bases. 
Therefore, states in transformation like Bulgaria and Romania, which already have some 
access to organizations like NATO and EU, can be used as a platform for attacks against 
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high profile targets in Europe or North America. On the other hand, keeping in mind that 
Al Qaeda has declared a global jihad against those states that support U.S. policy, and 
considering the active Bulgarian participation in the global war on terror, one can deduce 
that Bulgaria is a potential target. Although the state has not yet been attacked by 
terrorists, the probability of such an attack is relatively high. Some ten percent of the 
Bulgarian population is Muslim, which could be influenced by radical Islamic 
organizations. Furthermore, the pervasive ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia has 
attracted a considerable number of Muslim fighters (Sageman, 2004).  Their presence 
today creates a danger for the spreading of terrorist networks and fueling militant 
Islamism across neighboring countries, including Bulgaria.   
Being inherently insufficient to sustain their operations, the terrorist organizations 
rely on unorthodox tactics and techniques. Therefore, they are attracted to inexpensive 
weapons and low-visibility operations that can create large-scale devastation. The Al 
Qaeda attacks against the U.S., Spain, and UK reveal the new trends in terrorism. Most 
experts claim that the next objective for the terrorists could be acquiring WMD, 
specifically nuclear weapons. According to an article by Jeffrey Kluger that appeared in 
Time magazine, a Bin Laden agent tried to buy radioactive waste from a nuclear power 
plant in Bulgaria (2001). Considering the central location of Bulgaria in the strategic 
crossroads of the Balkans and the availability of atomic installations on its territory, 
nuclear proliferation and transportation is a substantial concern for Bulgarian security 
(ANSR, 2006). 
5. New Strategic Alliances for Bulgaria 
NATO membership and the future accession into the European Union are 
stabilizing factors for the security of Bulgaria. The participation in international military 
and European economic organizations is a considerable guarantee for the future of 
Bulgarian security. According to the Annual National Security Report for 2005, from a 
politico-military perspective, NATO is considered a basic factor which contributes to the 
national security of the state.  The NATO alliance possesses traditionally well-developed 
military capabilities, far exceeding the individual military potential of individual 
European countries. It is the only global military organization capable of protecting its 
 14
members should their security be endangered (ANSR, 2006).  NATO policy is based on 
close cooperation not only against conventional but also asymmetric threats.  As such, the 
most important yet demanding challenge for Bulgaria is to prove its commitment to 
NATO and the EU through the fulfillment of the requirements for membership.  
Bulgarian society and its politicians must recognize that participating in such unions does 
not serve only organizational interests, but, first and foremost, the strategic interests of 
the state. Beneficial relations among the partners in strategic alliances are based on 
balanced policies and commitments.  
6. Peripheral Factors Influencing Bulgarian National Security 
The new realities of dynamic political, economic, and organizational 
transformations can change the long lasting status-quo in certain regions. Destabilization 
of politically fragile geographical areas hides unpredictable risks for global peace and 
security (NSC, 1998). What is more, non-governmental organizations can become 
influential players that gradually supplant traditional state power-brokers. These 
organizations could facilitate terrorist and organized crime groups in pursuit of their 
agendas while exercising pressure on politically unstable and economically weak regions. 
High-technological dependence of developed countries is another issue of security 
concern. Over-reliance on insecure technological assets and informational innovations 
creates a potential danger for the security of the state. Finally, contemporary countries 
can be negatively affected by indirect factors such as diverse economic changes, natural 
disasters, and industrial calamities; all these catastrophic events can aggravate Bulgarian 
national stability and social peace (ANSR, 2006).  
C. SUMMARY 
The relatively long history of Bulgaria suggests that the state and its people are 
capable of surviving the hardships of time. Yet the contemporary geopolitical 
environment and latest threats pose new challenges for Bulgarian national security. On 
the one hand, the probability for a conventional conflict in the Balkans is relatively small. 
However, on the other hand, the threat of terrorism and proliferation of WMD is 
becoming a major concern for Bulgarian authorities. They must recognize that terrorist 
organizations and their networks are capable of launching a new kind of warfare against 
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nation states. The traditional expectations of contemporary countries for conventional 
conflicts do not coincide with the unconventional methods of the new, shadowy enemy.  
As a member of various international military, economic, and political 
organizations, Bulgaria faces these same threats and must establish an appropriate 
security strategy and tailor suitable means to attain it. There is an assumption that 
conventional military forces are not tailored to counter asymmetric threats, because an 
irregular adversary must be fought by correspondingly unconventional forces and 
innovative tactics.  This is where Special Operations Forces (SOF) come into play.  SOF 
could prove essential in the defense of Bulgarian national security objectives and the 
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III. BULGARIAN NATIONAL AND MILITRY STRATEGIES FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY 
The National Security Concept of 1998 provides strategic guidance for Bulgarian 
national security, while the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria, written in 
1999, regulates the military response to national security risks. There are several sources, 
such as the Annual National Security Report for 2005 and the Long-term Vision for 
Development of the Armed Forces of 2005, which provide updated information and new 
visions on the security and defense of the state. At the moment, the Bulgarian Parliament 
is in deliberations on a new draft of the National Security Strategy, which will constitute 
a basis for further development of a new military doctrine.  
The geopolitical climate and security environment in Bulgaria predefine the 
national political and military strategies. Likewise, the assessment of contemporary 
threats to national security provides major guidance for the foreign policy of the state. 
According to the evaluation of the internal and external political environments, the 
strategic priorities for Bulgaria are divided into foreign and domestic initiatives and tasks.  
A. REGIONAL POLICY 
1. Maintaining Regional Security and Stability 
Bulgaria’s top priority in the area of regional cooperation is “maintaining an 
active policy for consolidation of trust, stability, security, and implementation of 
European standards in bilateral relations with the countries within the region through 
assisting their efforts for admission into the European Union and NATO” (ANSR, 2006). 
As mentioned in the first chapter, Bulgaria has suffered territorial losses and diplomatic 
defeats inflicted by its neighbors throughout its history. The Balkan Wars and the First 
and Second World Wars inflicted considerable damage to the state which led to two 
national catastrophes and the loss of territory and the population of the country. 
Bulgaria’s adversaries in some of these wars were its neighbors – Turkey, Serbia, Greece, 
and Romania. From a historical perspective, having learned the lessons of these conflicts, 
Bulgarian authorities acknowledged the importance of regional stability and cooperation 
as a major factor for national security.  
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The substantiation of the importance for regional peace was the prolonged 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia.  The consequences of nearly a decade of fighting 
affected all neighboring countries -- in particular Bulgaria. Therefore, the stability of the 
Balkans is more likely to be achieved on the grounds of common standards and rules 
imposed by global organization. The process of stabilization and the strengthening of 
bilateral relations can be facilitated by mutual interests, general principles, and goals, 
which can be achieved through membership in NATO, the EU, and other global 
organizations. A good example is the Turkey and Greece dynamic.   
Turkey and Greece have a historically strained relationship.  Yet, in spite of their 
simmering hostilities, their membership in NATO has undoubtedly deterred conflict 
between the two.  Therefore, it would be correct to assume that memberships in 
organizations like NATO, the EU and perhaps surprisingly the Warsaw Pact lends itself 
to regional peace.  In fact, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Warsaw 
Pact, despite gaining their sovereignty, the Eastern European countries came away with a 
degraded national security. They were no longer a part of global military or economic 
organizations.  
With a few exceptions, the former socialist states are small.  It is clear that small 
countries are not always able to maintain reliable national security on their own. 
Therefore, they will always be dependent on international military organizations and 
economic unions.  As Vayrynen (1997) observes: “. . . the paradox of small powers is that 
they have to lose a part of their sovereignty by joining economic and security integration 
to become fully fledged members of the international community in order to reclaim their 
sovereignty” (p. 70). Evidently, small states do not have much of a choice; the price of 
their security is formed by participation in global organizations and a strict adherence to 
the standards of membership.  Considering that all the Balkan states except Turkey are 
small, they are likely to be willing to enhance their security by joining regional and 
global unions and organizations.  Indeed, the pace of admission of Balkan states into 
NATO and the EU is considerable; Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania are already 
NATO members. Greece is a member of the EU, while Bulgaria and Romania are 
expected to join at the beginning of 2007.  At the same time, the rest of the Balkan states 
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are at different levels of negotiations with NATO and the EU.  Keeping in mind that the 
underlying policies of these organizations point at peaceful relations, multilateral 
security, and economic prosperity, the existing members are highly interested in 
accession of countries from potentially unstable regions, like the Balkans.  Hence, as a 
present member, Bulgaria has recognized the importance of providing assistance to non-
member states in the Balkans for their timely admission and further integration into 
global organizations. 
2. The War on Terrorism 
Another important priority for Bulgaria is the war on terrorism. The Bulgarian 
leadership actively participates in the establishment of the UN Counterterrorism Strategy 
through actively supporting the Security Council and the UN in the global war on terror. 
Bulgaria has signed all thirteen UN conventions on counterterrorism and continues 
working on a national legal framework in response to terrorism.  The Bulgarian 
government participates in more than forty bilateral and regional agreements, which 
include the exchange of operational information, coordinated activities, and joint 
operations. Bulgarian security services work out and update complex national plans for 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism (ANSR, 2006). Apparently, the state plays an active 
role in all global and European initiatives, strengthening the legal basis related to the war 
on terror worldwide.  
According to the ANSR (2006), the other priorities for the Bulgarian foreign 
policy related to national security are as follows: 
• Exercising influence over the framework of the regional cooperation in 
accordance with Bulgarian national interests.     
• Broadening the span of particular regional joint initiatives for achieving 
long-lasting and mutually beneficial ends for Bulgaria and its foreign 
partners. 
• Initiation of activities for the accomplishment of transport, energy, and 
telecommunication projects related to politico-economic interests of 
Bulgaria. 
• Development of economic, social, and cultural cooperation with other 
countries.  
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Although the Bulgarian Concept for National Security states that “a national 
priority for Bulgaria is membership in NATO and the EU which corresponds to the long-
term interests of the country” (1998), the Bulgarian leadership should not blindly support 
the decisions of these organizations. Despite the imposed European standards of foreign 
policy, Bulgaria should sustain its strategic interests.  As Vayrynen (1997) asserts, “Small 
states have firmly established themselves as independent actors in European regional 
organizations, but their influence depends on their ability to shape political agendas, 
propose institutional innovations, and forge coalitions” (p. 70). Therefore, Bulgarian 
policy can contribute to stability in the region by intensifying mutually beneficial 
political activities and economic projects through utilization of its membership in global 
organizations. Deep political, economic, and social relations contribute to long-lasting 
security and peace among regional partners. 
3. The U.S. as a Strategic Partner for Bulgaria 
In addition to the membership in NATO and the EU, the Bulgarian leadership has 
chosen the U.S. as a strategic partner, complementing the factors that support Bulgarian 
national security. The reason for this choice is deeply embedded in the historic 
background of international diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and other European 
state powers.  Bordonaro provides a punctual observation:  
Historically, the main security concern for all Eastern, Central-Eastern and 
South-Eastern European countries has been not to fall prey to German or 
Russian hegemony. An offshore great power (Great Britain or the U.S.) is 
therefore preferable to a continental one. Politically, the U.S. simply has 
momentum and capabilities far superior to French and German ones in the 
last 15 years, explaining its attractiveness to these smaller European states 
(2005).  
The Bulgarian authorities envision the U.S. as a powerful and reliable partner 
with global influence and economic potential.  However, the benefits of partnership are 
not only Bulgaria’s, as the U.S. recognizes the strategic location of Bulgaria and its 
proximity to the Middle East.  Not surprisingly, both countries signed an agreement for 
military cooperation, which includes the establishment of temporary U.S. military bases 
within Bulgaria.  As stated earlier, Bulgaria is an active partner in the global war on 
terror, providing forces to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Therefore, the U.S. has 
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assisted Bulgaria in reforming its military by advising military leadership and financing 
various programs for modernization of the Bulgarian Armed Forces (ANSR, 2005). 
Clearly, the relations between both countries are established on mutually beneficial 
interests.  
B. INTERNAL SECURITY 
Internal security of the Republic of Bulgaria is a necessary complement to its 
overall national security strategy. Both foreign and domestic priorities of the national 
security are mutually dependent. According to ANSR, the maintenance of interior 
security of the state will be based on the accomplishment of the following activities:  
• Defining and endorsement of strategic objectives for Bulgarian security 
policy as a basic factor for protecting national interests.   
• Cooperation and coordination among security services of the Republic of 
Bulgaria and the countries members of NATO, the EU, and neighboring 
states.  
• Establishment of political stability and democratic institutions, obeying 
the law, effective protection of human rights and efficient market 
economy.  
• Economic prosperity, effective social policy, improvement of national 
education system, and scientific research in the area of security.  
• Achieving and maintaining national consensus on essential issues that 
contribute to national security and protect interests of the state (ANSR, 
2006).  
One of the most important priorities is the designation of strategic objectives in 
support of internal security.  Without clearly defining the methods of accomplishing 
internal security, attaining internal stability and prosperity for the country will be far less 
likely.  This prerequisite is of paramount significance for a small state like Bulgaria. For 
that reason, Bulgarian authorities and the Parliament should adopt an updated National 
Security Strategy (NSS) as soon as possible.  The NSS is a foundation document that 
provides guidance for all national institutions related to national security. An 
identification and endorsement of national security policy will facilitate future 
cooperation and coordination with security services of NATO, the EU, and neighboring 
states, which is a second priority for internal national security of Bulgaria.  Recalling that 
the state is a newly established democratic entity with a developing market economy, it 
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becomes increasingly vulnerable to contemporary security risks.  Moreover, the geo-
strategic location of Bulgaria in the Balkans is another complicating factor for national 
security. Due to its limited resources, the state is in no position unilaterally to ensure its 
safety.  Thus, successfully countering security threats is impossible without close 
cooperation with friendly countries. Keeping in mind that contemporary states anticipate 
similar security challenges, the inadequate national security of Bulgaria could affect the 
safety of its partners worldwide. Therefore, international collaboration is a necessary 
prerequisite and a mutually beneficial process for both Bulgarian national and 
international security.  
The next level of domestic security is the establishment and further maintenance 
of a stable institutional architecture of the country, viable democratic mechanisms, a 
properly working judicial system, and an efficient market economy; each of these are 
necessary prerequisites for achieving the goals of Bulgarian national security. 
Alternatively, organized crime and corruption constitute one of the gravest internal 
problems for the state. Coupled with the underdeveloped judiciary system, Bulgaria is 
criticized by the European Union for these predicaments because they could affect the 
security of other European states. As mentioned earlier, the unstable and insecure 
national environment could attract international terrorist organizations and radical Islamic 
groups. Facilitated by organized crime, they could use Bulgaria as an entry point to 
Western Europe and, possibly, to the U.S. (ANSR, 2006).  Of particular concern, the 
country has a nuclear power-plant, which could be targeted or used as a source for 
acquisition of nuclear material by terrorists.  
The welfare of the Bulgarian society is another basic component of internal 
security; it is closely related to the aforementioned priorities of the security strategy. The 
well-being of Bulgarians could be considered as a natural barrier for organized crime, 
corruption, and, indirectly, terrorism. Furthermore, social prosperity can be achieved 
through appropriate economic and social policy providing a high level of employment, 
beneficial conditions for retirement, obeying human rights, and investing in education 
and culture. A successful accomplishment of all these priorities could establish a stable 
domestic security environment with a prosperous society united on essential issues that 
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contribute to strategic interests of the Republic of Bulgaria while facilitating the military 
and civilian law-enforcement agencies protecting Bulgarian national and global security.  
C. BULGARIAN MILITARY STRATEGY 
Bulgarian defense policy is a vital component of the foreign and domestic security 
policy of the state. The ANSR states that the major objective of the Military Strategy is 
the establishment and maintenance of a favorable security environment for the attainment 
of Bulgarian national interests. Therefore, defense policy is predefined by national 
interests and is an element of the overall security policy of the state. The defense policy 
of the state is exercised within the context of NATO’s collective defense and in 
accordance with the requirements of Bulgaria’s pending membership in the EU. The 
defense of the country has shifted from the neutralization of a specific adversary to the 
development of capabilities designed to respond to specific risks and threats.  This 
change sought to better address Bulgaria’s modern security threats.  
The Bulgarian Armed Forces have commenced a process of dynamic 
transformation. A major goal for the defense of the state is safeguarding security and 
preserving its territorial integrity in the context of NATO collective defenses through a 
complete mobilization and involvement of national capabilities and resources.  The 
Ministry of Defense is determined to develop a modern and effective defense system and 
armed forces with capabilities and organizational designs adequate to attend to national 
interests, the challenges of the security environment, and the regulations of NATO.  
Improving the Bulgarian Armed Forces and their capabilities for the requirements 
of national security and NATO regulations is a major objective of the military 
transformation. The main principles of this process are outlined in the 2004 Strategic 
Review of Defense and are defined for implementation in the Long-Term Vision for the 
Development of the Armed Forces (LTVDAF); both documents are cited in the ANSR. 
According to the LTVDAF, the Bulgarian Armed Forces must be transformed into 
combat-efficient, multi-purpose, relatively self-sufficient, properly equipped, and highly 




abroad.  Evidently, the transformation of the armed forces is carried out for the successful 
accomplishment of missions and tasks generated by local and global security 
environments (ANSR, 2006).    
According to the ANSR (2006) the most important military efforts are directed at:  
• Transformation of armed forces for attainment of the required operational 
capabilities. 
• Transformation of procedures and practices for establishment and 
implementation of security and defense policy. 
 
• An effective membership in NATO. 
• Integration into the system of European policy on security and defense. 
The Bulgarian military leadership continues its active participation in the process 
for the development of NATO’s defense policy and implementation of the allied 
resolutions.  As a NATO partner, Bulgaria participates in the forces planning process of 
the alliance through harmonizing national procedures and mechanisms. According to the 
agreements with NATO, the Bulgarian authorities continue to execute the Forces’ Goals 
Plan (FGP) approved in 2004, which includes 70 goals. In accordance with the plan, 
Bulgaria has committed 21 combat and combat service support units to NATO’s 
collective defense.  These 21 units must be operational not later than 2010 (ANSR, 
2006). One of these forces’ goals refers to Bulgarian SOF; it is the EG 3520 – Special 
Operations Task Force for the NATO Response Force (68Pth P SFBDE, 2006).  The 
objective of the FGP is that Bulgarian military units achieve full operational capability 
according to NATO standards.  However, NATO is not the only organization in which 
Bulgaria participates; the state also continues its commitments to the Paris Initiative for 
providing defensive capabilities. The Bulgarian contribution to the initiative is comprised 
of eleven commitments in four areas: defense against nuclear, chemical, and biological 
threats; acquisition of informational superiority, combat effectiveness, and operational 
interoperability; development of capabilities for rapid deployment, and combat service 
support for the armed forces (ANSR, 2006).  
The integration in the system of the European policy on security and defense is 
another leading priority for the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Bulgaria. 
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Therefore, Bulgarian military units continue their active role in Operation Althea under 
the EU command in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, Bulgaria has declared its 
willingness to participate in the multinational tactical combat group of the EU. It might 
be concluded that Bulgaria considers the participation of its armed forces in missions and 
operations abroad as activities that generate security for the state. Through actively 
supporting international initiatives directed to enhancing global security, a country may 
engage the anticipated threats far away from its borders.  Likewise, it is through such 
commitments the Bulgarian leadership fulfills its responsibilities to the EU and NATO, 
which contributes to global security. Presently, Bulgaria has forces deployed in Kosovo, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and participates with military observers 
under UN command in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Liberia (ANSR, 2006).  
D. SUMMARY 
Bulgarian national security strategy is a complex set of international and domestic 
policies that are pointed at maintaining national interests and safeguarding the security of 
the state. For the implementation of the national security strategy, Bulgarian authorities 
rely on a smooth interrelation between political, military, economic, and social agencies, 
yet the military potential of a state provides a basic foundation for its secure existence 
and functioning.  As a result, national security strategy and national military strategy are 
closely related. Considering the security environment and possible threats for Bulgaria, 
its efforts are directed at strengthening international political and economic cooperation 
in the Balkan region, developing stable democratic institutions and advanced security 
services in the country, and transforming the Bulgarian Armed Forces into a highly 
capable military asset for national and collective security within NATO.  However, the 
necessary military transformation will be expensive.  
Military transformation is a protracted, complex, and costly process that consists 
of organizational, operational, and technological changes. Stated earlier, the objective of 
the transformation is to establish combat-efficient, multi-purpose, relatively self-
sufficient, properly equipped, and highly mobile military units with joint capabilities for 
deployment on the territory of the state or abroad in response to contemporary threats 
against Bulgaria or its NATO allies. All these specifications differ significantly from the 
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Cold War mindset which dictated the possession of large conventional forces designed to 
confront a similarly organized enemy on an open battlefield.  However, times have 
changed.  Today, the best response to Bulgaria’s new and emerging threats are 
unconventional forces, defined by Joint Publication 3-05 (2003) as “a small size, unique 
capabilities, self-sufficiency (for short periods of time) … providing appropriate military 
responses” (p. xx).  The nature of the present Bulgarian security environment and the 
national and military strategies suggest that Bulgarian SOF (BSOF) could be the most 
appropriate military asset for countering the asymmetric threats for Bulgarian national 
security. Whether or not BSOF is widely regarded as a valuable military tool, an analysis 








IV. THE ROLE OF BULGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY 
STRATEGIES 
A. A HISTORIC OVERVIEW OF BULGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
FORCES 
The first Bulgarian military unit with special capabilities was established in the 
spring of 1942. It was a 400-man airborne detachment that underwent training in 
Germany.  In addition to providing tactical training, Germany also armed and equipped 
the unit.  Ironically, its first deployment was against German forces retreating from 
Greece in 1945.  Known as the battle of Stracin-Strajin, the unit demonstrated 
exceptional heroism and completed their assigned task by capturing important positions 
in the German rear area of operations. This was done with a cost of 59 dead and 151 
wounded Bulgarian soldiers. At the end of the war, this unit went through various 
reorganizations and transformations. In 1964, two airborne reconnaissance regiments 
were established: one in the city of Plovdiv and another in Mosachevo (close to the 
capital of Sofia). In 1975, the two units merged and formed the 68th Airborne 
Reconnaissance Regiment located in Plovdiv.  In 1993, the regiment was reorganized into 
a brigade and was subordinated to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff.  This 
higher position recognized its strategic importance to the Bulgarian politico-military 
leadership. 
The brigade was planned and employed at a joint level with minimal interference 
from, or dependence on, the other services of the Bulgarian Armed Forces.  More so than 
conventional units, the brigade was well-equipped with contemporary (for that time) 
special weapons, communication assets, and special equipment. Meanwhile, three 
additional airborne reconnaissance battalions were formed and placed under the 
command of the Army. These three battalions later merged as the 1st Airborne 
Reconnaissance Regiment (ARR). Both the 68th Airborne Reconnaissance Brigade 
(ARB) and the 1st ARR developed and maintained Spetsnaz, or Special Assignment, 
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(Spetnaz is the Russian version of U.S. Army Special Forces) capabilities designed to 
carry out unique missions to include special reconnaissance, direct  action, subversion, 
and unconventional warfare.   
In 2001, the 68th ARB was renamed the 68th Special Forces Brigade (SFB).  
Together with the 1st ARR and a recently established psychological operations (PSYOP) 
battalion, they were placed under the newly founded Special Operations Forces 
Command (SOFCOM). This command was subordinated to the Army HQ.  In doing so, 
BSOF lost its strategic relevance.  It became part of the planning, decision-making, and 
procurement system of the Army. From that moment, BSOF was obstructed, dependent 
upon, and downgraded by conventional commanders of the armed services.  
The first combat assignment for Army SOFCOM units was the participation in the 
post-war recovery of Iraq in 2003. According to the decision of the national politico-
military leadership, Bulgarian military were not deployed as organic units, but as ad-hoc 
components made up of volunteers. The likely reason for that decision was the 
unwillingness of Bulgarian authorities to order the deployment of military units that were 
not fully manned with volunteers, and because of transformation, the Bulgarian Armed 
Forces likely did not have capable organic units at the battalion level for such a 
deployment. At that time, military laws did not envision a mandatory deployment of 
Bulgarian military units abroad. Although the ad-hoc organization reduced the 
operational capabilities of the deployed units, BSOF soldiers demonstrated a high level of 
professionalism, combat efficiency, and bravery.  Four BSOF operators lost their lives 
and many were wounded in various operations in Iraq (68th SFBDE, 2006).  If BSOF had 
been deployed as organic teams organized into a task force with a SOF HQ element, 
these casualties might have not occurred and the security of the Bulgarian battalion in 
Iraq might have better maintained.  A successful accomplishment of a military mission 
abroad is more likely to enhance Bulgarian national security.  
Unfortunately, as part of the latest reorganization according to the LTVDAF, 
there is a diminution of BSOF.  In an interview dated June 8th, 2006, the Chief of the 
General Staff General Stoykov stated that: “According to the plans for transformation, 
the Bulgarian Special Operations Forces Command has been cut down” (2006, Penkova). 
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Accordingly, the 1st ARR is expected to be reduced to a battalion and will be 
subordinated to the 68th SF Brigade.  The PSYOP battalion will be reduced to a company 
and will be shifted away from the BSOF community. Such insular thinking could prove 
costly.  Considering the growing emergence of asymmetric security risks worldwide and 
assuming that Special Forces possess appropriate military capabilities to counter such 
threats, the downsizing of BSOF will likely negatively affect Bulgarian national security.   
B. THE ROLE OF BSOF IN THE MILITARY STRATEGY.  
The role of BSOF in the national and military security strategies is portrayed 
indirectly in official open source documents such as concepts and doctrines. There are 
very few unclassified texts on national or military strategies that directly refer to Special 
Forces and their potential employment.  In several official documents, the use of BSOF is 
implied in general terms. In only a handful of open sources do senior Bulgarian officials 
and high-ranking military officers mention BSOF in the context of national security.  
This is similar to the U.S. SOF.  Senior leaders in the U.S. largely ignored U.S. SOF prior 
to the September 11th attacks.  According to the testimony of Congressman Curt Weldon, 
referring to the causes of al-Qaeda’s attacks, U.S. SOF had identified the most important 
cells of al-Qaeda and proposed a plan to eliminate them. Unfortunately, the U.S. 
leadership rejected the suggested operation.  Indirectly, their inaction probably facilitated 
the epic attacks on 9/11 (Verton, 2003).  The general lack of information on BSOF in 
official documents is probably predetermined by the secrecy and sensitivity of 
employment of Special Forces in the interest of Bulgarian national security. Another 
explanation for the scarce analyses on the issue could be the misunderstanding and 
underestimation by senior political and military leaders of the potential of special 
operations.  
1. Employment of BSOF in Counterterrorist (CT) Operations  
The Military Doctrine (MD) of the Republic of Bulgaria provides general 
direction for employment of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Although somewhat dated 
(written in 1999 and amended in 2002), the MD is the current “system of strategic views, 
principles and approaches to ensure Bulgarian national security in political and military 
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terms” (MD, 2002). Revealing various regulations for the employment of the armed 
forces, the doctrine also indirectly implies the employment of BSOF. According to the 
Bulgarian MD:  
49. During peace time and in cases of crisis of non-military character, 
armed forces: 
a. Participate in the preventive and direct protection of the population 
in cases of threats, accidents and catastrophes. 
b. Assist, in compliance with the Constitution and the laws of the 
Republic of Bulgaria, the security services in their efforts against the 
proliferation of WMD, illegal trafficking of arms, international terrorism, 
etc.  
c. Participate in the protection of strategic sites and in operations to 
prevent international organized crime or terrorist activities, after military 
help is required by the competent organs and in a way defined by the 
legislation (2002). 
As discussed later in the thesis, Special Forces might be considered as a capable 
military asset to deal with unconventional threats like terrorism, the proliferation of 
WMD, and illegal arms trafficking. Moreover, CEDESOF, written in 2000, assigns 
BSOF such tasks as supporting activities in the counter-proliferation of WMD, 
countering drug and arms trafficking, and counterterrorism. BSOF supports operations 
conducted by law-enforcement agencies by providing sensitive intelligence and security 
of strategic sites, convoying the transportation of dangerous substances, and executing 
direct action missions in inaccessible or politically denied areas (2002, p. 12).  Although 
BSOF is a subordinate to the Bulgarian Army, the Bulgarian MD and CEDESOF 
envision BSOF as a primary military asset for countering asymmetric threats in the 
interest of protecting national security, while the Bulgarian Armed Forces are organized, 
trained, equipped, and employed for conducting conventional operations. 
A report titled “The Role of the Bulgarian Armed Forces Countering Terrorist 
Threats,” written by the Chief of Operations the General Staff Brigadier General 
Pehlivanov (2006), confirms the former assumption stating that:  
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The active participation of armed forces on the territory of the state 
encompasses: . . . in case of emergency, an assistance to the units of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs in their counterterrorist activities; the support 
will be basically provided by BSOF.  
The report further directs: 
[The] Bulgarian Special Forces to develop and exercise their 
counterterrorism capabilities according to planned programs and courses. 
An additional priority for the development of a military counterterrorist 
capability is the qualitative improvement of training, armament, and 
equipment for BSOF and significantly expanding its mobility.  
This statement supports the notion of the growing relevance of BSOF in the war 
on terror (WOT).  Taillon (2001) found that “Terrorism is not a specific phenomenon: it 
is part of continuum from low-intensity conflict, subversion, and guerrilla warfare tactics, 
to acts of spectacular violence designed to make a political, rather than military, point” 
(p. xi).  Considering that SOF are tailored and trained to operate against irregular threats, 
and assuming that successful counterterrorism operations require proportionate and 
analogous responses, one may conclude that special forces are a suitable military 
counterterrorist asset.  Keeping in mind that terrorists tend to operate unconventionally 
and attack the least expected and most sensitive targets, crises related to terrorism 
demand a proactive, swift, and decisive response.   
It may be argued that SOF should not be employed for resolving terrorist crises, 
and that national law-enforcement agencies should be unilaterally responsible for dealing 
with such threats. In fact, the involvement of military units, particularly SOF, in CT 
operations should be approved by national politico-military authorities. But crises related 
to terrorism or the proliferation of WMD usually create a complex and dynamic 
environment.  Hence, the employment of civilian counterterrorist units may not be the 
most plausible solution. Typically, law-enforcement agencies do not possess assets for a 
swift and long-range projection of force, nor are their units equipped and trained to 
operate in inaccessible or denied areas.  Taillon (2001) observes that: 
The importance of intelligence gathering and dissemination, the creation 
and organization and training of counterterrorist forces, the requirement of 
forward-basing of these forces during international accidents, and the 
 32
nature of the precrisis cooperation between the countries concerned are 
stark necessities if a counter-terrorist action is to be successful on the 
contemporary scene (p. xi).  
Counter-terror efforts should be undertaken as multilateral activities, in which 
SOF is given either a primary or supporting role.  Recalling the statements in the MD and 
CEDESOF, the Bulgarian military leadership relies on the use of BSOF to counter 
asymmetric threats in support of national security.  That said, these forces must be 
properly organized, trained and equipped in order to be a useful asset for countering such 
threats. In conclusion, Taillon (2001) maintains that “ … [E]lite forces, organized, armed, 
trained, and structured for the counter-terrorist role, can be an effective arm of 
governments in dealing with terrorism” (p. xi). 
2. Employment of BSOF in Peace Support Operations (PSO) 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Bulgaria participates in various PSO 
worldwide, in accordance with its policy of stabilizing local crises. The involvement of 
the Bulgarian Armed Forces in such operations is determined by the following articles in 
the MD (2002):  
51.  In case of an international military political crisis, the Bulgarian 
Armed Forces participate in Peace Support Operations and operations 
other than war in compliance with the mandate given to the country.  
52.  In operations other than war, the allocated contingents are assigned 
to and participate in missions in compliance with the relevant agreements.  
53.  In operations other than war, the contingents of the Armed Forces 
implement special forms and use specific means of action in compliance 
with the approved terms of use of the armed forces. 
Additionally, the Bulgarian Military Strategy (2002) states: 
The formations from the Bulgarian Armed Forces which take part in peace 
support operations outside the territory of the country, can conduct land, 
air, navy or special operations under the terms of peace support 
operations.  
The employment of BSOF in PSO is clearly outlined in the Bulgarian Military 
Strategy. The components that will participate in PSO are previously defined by 
multilateral agreements based on the operation’s mandate. On the one hand, international 
organizations establish a framework for participation.  On the other hand, the 
participating nations are able to mold their contingents according to the anticipated 
threats, but still in compliance with the approved terms. Thus, if Bulgarian politico-
military authorities decide to deploy BSOF, it can be used independently or as a 
supporting sub-unit of a Bulgarian PSO force. In fact, the first deployment of Bulgarian 
Special Forces was in the PSO for the stabilization and post-war recovery of Iraq (68th 
SFBDE, 2006). Although the employment of BSOF was carried out in an ad-hoc manner 
-- three SOF teams were organized into a platoon and attached to a light infantry 
company -- and not in typical accord with SOF Special Operating Procedures (SOP), the 
success of the BSOF involvement in this PSO was widely acknowledged.  In a press 
conference on April 13th , 2004 the former Chief of the General Staff, General Nikola 
Kolev, placed special emphasis on a special operation in which BSOF teams (developed 
prior to the deployment) successfully defeated Iraqi insurgents while defending the 
central administrative buildings of Karbala (We Defended Our Positions in Karbala, 
2004). In addition to the latter example, the following table illustrates that almost the 
whole spectrum of special operations may potentially be conducted during a PSO 
campaign. PSO operations are performed during the post-conflict period.  
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The Bulgarian CEDESOF includes almost all tasks that are shown in the table. 
Although Bulgarian Military Strategy (2002) includes military assistance as one of the 
missions for the armed forces, according to the CEDESOF, foreign internal defense (FID) 
and unconventional warfare (UW) are not included as tasks for BSOF. Yet under specific 
conditions, they might contribute to the success of a PSO. Considering the combat 
experience from Iraq and the SO tasks outlined in CEDESOF, the operations that BSOF 
is most capable of executing in the context of a PSO are counterterrorism (CT), special 
reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), and limited PSYOP. Bulgarian Special Forces 
could assist in close cooperation with law-enforcement agencies counter-proliferation 
operations. BSOF possesses a set of special capabilities that elevate its relevance in PSO. 
To maximize the effectiveness of BSOF, the forces should be used appropriately – often 
this means employment in accordance with special operations SOPs or as an independent 
task force comprised of HQ element and operational detachments. Thus, Bulgarian MS 
and MD envision BSOF not only as a significant force multiplier for Bulgarian 
peacekeeping contingents but also as an independent task force participating in PSOs 
worldwide. 
3. Employment of BSOF in Humanitarian Crisis Operations  
Apart form a war-fighting employment, Bulgarian Special Forces can provide 
assistance during humanitarian operations. Article 50 of the MD states: 
50.  In peace time and in case of an international humanitarian crisis, 
the Bulgarian Armed Forces participate with contingents in humanitarian 
and rescue operations. The units will be deployed to the crisis area and 
will carry out search-and-rescue, evacuation, restoration operations and 
other supporting activities (2002). 
The doctrine indirectly implies that as a part of the armed forces, BSOF might 
participate in search and rescue (SAR) and evacuation and humanitarian operations in 
support of the civilian population. Under certain circumstances the outcome from the 
provision of humanitarian assistance can be much more valuable than the result of 
conducting kinetic military operations. BSOF once again is regarded by Bulgarian MD 
and, indirectly, by the military leadership, as a valuable asset for Bulgarian or foreign 
authorities in humanitarian operations.  
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4. Employment of BSOF in Conventional Operations  
During a conventional conflict, BSOF will be tasked according to the overall 
planning for offensive or defensive campaigns in the interest of protecting Bulgarian 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Keeping in mind that Bulgarian Special 
Forces are subordinated to Army HQ, and considering the organizational reductions they 
have recently undertaken, it appears that BSOF will be regarded predominantly as a 
supporting element for conventional forces during high intensity conflicts. It is a common 
perception, particularly amongst Army commanders, that SOF should have a supporting 
role in a conventional campaign. BSOF is subordinated to the Army; therefore, it may be 
assumed that it could be given the task of executing mainly SR and DA. Alternatively, if 
it is employed at a joint level under the direct C2 of the General Staff, for example, 
BSOF may deter the enemy by conducting proactive direct or indirect operations against 
strategic, time-sensitive, and high or low-profile targets prior to the commencement of 
the conflict. In the context of a conventional crisis directly threatening the sovereignty 
and the territorial integrity of the state, the Bulgarian MS states:  
The Bulgarian Armed Forces support the political and diplomatic efforts 
for regulation of the crisis directly threatening national security; they 
maintain and use forces and assets for early warning and immediate 
reaction. Elements of the Armed Forces are kept in readiness for adequate 
reaction and interaction with other authorities and organizations (2002).  
Furthermore, the Bulgarian CEDESOF defines special operations (SO) as planned 
and coordinated military activities conducted by specially organized, trained, and 
equipped forces for achieving military, political or informational ends in hostile or 
politically sensitive environments (2000, p. 5). One may conclude that SO offer a source 
of strategic alternative and that BSOF is a military asset which can provide proactive and 
deterrent activities in support of Bulgarian national security against conventional threats. 
Referring to political signaling, Cohen (1978) suggests that:  
Elite units offer two basic advantages to the would-be signaler. First, they 
may be inherently valuable as a signaler of serious commitment because 
of their reputation… Secondly, elite units tend to offer governments better 
chances for success than the regular units in performing a sensitive 
signaling operation. Extreme reliability is obviously necessary for an 
action whose aims are symbolic than purely military (p. 49-50). 
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The flexibility, adaptability, and improvisation of BSOF could proactively 
provide strategic results, even during conventional combat operations (CEDESOF, 2000). 
One might conclude that Bulgarian Military Strategy and the politico-military leadership 
rely on the advantages offered by BSOF even during a conventional crisis.  
C. THE ROLE OF BSOF IN BULGARIAN NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY 
Recalling the strategic priorities of the state outlined in the previous chapter, the 
role of BSOF in Bulgarian national security strategy can be indirectly assumed. In any 
instance where national security strategy refers to solutions through or with the support of 
military means, Bulgarian Special Forces may potentially be used. Bulgarian Military 
Strategy and Doctrine are based on the Bulgarian National Security Concept; therefore, 
Bulgarian military policy is predicated on the requirements of national security and 
strategic interests. Consequently, all the security issues identified in the Bulgarian 
security strategy that require military responses are comprehensively addressed in the 
Bulgarian Military Strategy. 
The ANSR states:  
The Republic of Bulgaria will protect its national interests and will 
guarantee the stability of the state against external threats through active 
foreign policy and security consistent strategy. The country will contribute 
to the efforts of the international community in strengthening peace and 
stability worldwide (2006).  
The first part of the statement includes, aside from political activities, a military 
response against conventional threats posed by an external enemy, which is a basic 
responsibility for the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Also, as previously mentioned, BSOF will 
be involved in the overall planning process for the defense of the state. The second part 
of the citation could incorporate the employment of Bulgarian military units, potentially 
including Special Forces, in PSOs mandated by international organizations.  Furthermore, 
considering that asymmetric threats are the greatest risks to national security, ANSR 
outlines future priorities: “The war against terrorism is long lasting and requires decisive 
implementation of military, law-enforcement, political, financial, and informational 
countermeasures and resources on the basis of a special counterterrorist system” (2006). 
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This document assigns the military, and in large point BSOF, a fundamental role 
in the war on terror, ahead of the other national security agencies. By contrast, General 
Pehlivanov clearly stated that BSOF can be used only as a final resort and in support to 
law-enforcement agencies during CT operations. If this “discord” between the political 
and military views for employment of BSOF in CT operations is unintentional, then the 
former appears to be a new approach in which the armed forces, particularly BSOF, is 
regarded as a primary asset for CT responses. This change in the Bulgarian CT policy 
may be influenced by the U.S. example. The 2006 U.S. National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism (NSCT) states: “Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, 
financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend 
our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to 
operate and survive” (2006, p. 1).  Evidently, the military is a priority for the U.S. 
administration fighting the GWT. Furthermore, the strategy envisions the efforts of the 
Department of Defense to meet the challenges of terrorism by “…significantly expanding 
SOF, increasing the capabilities of its general purpose forces to conduct irregular warfare 
operations, and initiating the largest rearrangement of its global force posture since the 
end of World War II” (NSCT, 2006, p. 20). Providing further support to this concept, the 
U.S. National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP for WOT) Annex 
C, Operations “…establishes Commander of United States Special Operations Forces 
Command as the supported command for the GWT” (2006. p. 28). Evidently, the U.S. 
politico-military leadership envisions the military, particularly U.S. SOF, as the primary 
CT asset for waging the GWT. Considering the strategic partnership between the U.S. 
and Bulgaria, one might suggest that Bulgarian authorities would be willing to 
incorporate the U.S. experience and assign the Bulgarian Armed Forces, primarily BSOF, 
as the primary asset in the war on terror. As the U.S. continuously refines its strategy and 
doctrine for the WT, its CT policies, efforts, and experience should be favorably regarded 
by the Bulgarian political and military leadership. 
D. SUMMARY 
Both Bulgarian national and military strategies indirectly envision BSOF as a 
significant military asset in support of national security and strategic interests. According 
to the Bulgarian Military Doctrine, Military Strategy, the ANSR, and the professional 
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opinion of much of the military leadership, Bulgarian Special Forces can be utilized as a 
supporting or supported element in CT operations domestically or abroad. In the event of 
a conventional conflict, BSOF can be employed as a force multiplier or as a rapid-
reaction asset that conducts proactive indirect or direct operations in the interest of 
Bulgarian national security. Furthermore, CEDESOF states that if a need arises for the 
deployment of international PSO, BSOF can be included in the national contingent or 
deployed independently with a specific assignment. Finally, in the event of humanitarian 
crises or catastrophic natural disasters, BSOF can provide assistance by indirectly 
supporting Bulgarian national interests.  
All the aforementioned utilities of BSOF emphasize its potentially significant role 
as a guardian of Bulgarian national security and strategic interests. Military and national 
strategies, and indirectly the Bulgarian politico-military leadership rely on the strategic 
advantages offered by BSOF. One may argue that BSOF is only indirectly referred to in 
both national and military strategies; the reason for that is either the insufficient open 
source information regarding BSOF’s employment or the politico-military sensitivity of 
the utilization of special forces as a guardian of Bulgarian national security and interests. 
Yet the analysis conducted in this chapter must be expanded beyond the role of BSOF in 
national and military strategies. After becoming a NATO member in 2004, the political 
leadership of Bulgaria declared that this military alliance is a major component of 
Bulgarian national security (ANSR, 2006). Therefore, the Bulgarian Armed Forces, 
including BSOF, should meet not only the requirements of Bulgarian national and 
military strategies, but also the responsibilities and challenges posed by membership in 




V. BSOF AND CURRENT NATO STANDARDS AND 
REGULATIONS 
Vayryanen opines that small states are more exposed to hostilities and are less 
likely to survive the wars waged by large states. Therefore, they tend to participate in 
international military or political organizations, using the membership to create and 
enforce rules and regulations in their favor. The author concludes that “usually, 
international institutions are the best friends of small states” (1997, p. 42). The history of 
Bulgaria supports Vayryanen’s statement; in 1913, during the Balkan Wars, Bulgaria was 
attacked by all its neighbors: Turkey, Greece, Serbia, and Romania. Being a neutral state 
and unprotected by participation in an international alliance, it suffered huge territorial 
losses (Bulgaria’s History, 2006). This historic lesson has influenced Bulgarian 
governments, both past and present, to participate in various international political and 
military organizations. During WWI, WWII, and the Cold War, Bulgaria participated in 
such alliances.  
For nearly fifteen years during the post-Cold War period, Bulgaria did not take 
part in a global military organization, but in 2004, it joined NATO. According to 
numerous official Bulgarian sources, NATO is the most important international military 
organization for Bulgarian national security. Moreover, the ANSR states that “In 2005, 
national defense was based on the effective employment of the state defense potential, 
which included the armed forces and non-military components, through integrated 
defense planning under NATO regulations” (2006). Considering the significance of 
NATO in Bulgarian plans for defense and national security, the integration of the 
Bulgarian Armed Forces into the military structure of the Alliance is obligatory. As part 








1. New challenges for NATO 
NATO was founded on April 4th, 1949 as a military alliance to protect Western 
European countries and North America against aggression from the USSR. The most 
important agreement is defined by Article 5 which states:  
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area (NATO, 1949). 
However, the changing nature of the security environment following the end of 
the Cold War requires the development of a new grand strategy for NATO. This strategy 
should be based on a specific force structure and corresponding operational capabilities. 
Binnendijk, Gompert, and Kugler assert that NATO should develop  
…a new defense framework for its combat forces and other defense 
capabilities… The framework covers the full spectrum of dangers that 
Americans and Europeans agree exist and capabilities needed by the 
Alliance to meet these dangers. The framework is capabilities-based, not 
threat-based, meaning that it is predicted on what NATO members think 
their alliance should be able to do, not on predictions of who their enemies 
might be (2005).  
The authors suggest that U.S. and European forces must be prepared for major 
combat operations that could cover a wide spectrum of geographic locations and missions 
such as: “limited intervention, conflict prevention, crisis management, consequence 
management, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, post-conflict occupation, 
stabilization and reconstruction, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, partnership 
building, and the creation of democratically accountable and capable military 
establishments.” For such a wide range of missions, NATO requires forces of 
multidimensional capabilities and skills that are expanded beyond traditional deterrence 
missions of the past (Binnendijk, Gompert, & Kugler, 2005, pp. 4-5).  
The authors propose a possible future NATO force structure, graphically shown 
as a pyramid in Figure 2, corresponding to the required capabilities of the organization. 
Each line of the pyramid represents a required military asset for “new-era missions.” 
According to the Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), the present NATO force structure is 
comprised of High Readiness Forces, Forces of Lower Readiness, and Long-Term Build-
up Forces (NATO, 2002, pp. 1-6). Alternatively, the assessment of all elements of the 
pyramid reveals a different approach of the development of capabilities and organization 
of NATO forces. With respect to this thesis, NATO SOF (NSOF) represents a major 
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Figure 2.   A NATO Framework for Future Forces and Capabilities for Expeditionary 
Missions (Binnendijk, Gompert, & Kugler, 2005, p. 5) 
 
2. Interoperability in NATO 
NATO has a strict policy regarding standardization. This policy is important for 
the sound functioning of such a complex military organization, because  “An Alliance of 
26 nations can only effectively work together in joint operations if provisions are in place 
to ensure smooth cooperation” (Interoperability for Joint Operations, 2006, p. 1). 
Interoperability constitutes “the ability of different military organizations to conduct joint 
operations. These organizations can be of different nationalities or different armed 
services (ground, naval and air forces) or both” (p. 1). In order to effectively contribute to 
collective defenses, all members of the Alliance should strive to achieve operational 
interoperability. Therefore, NATO has developed regulations to attain its standardization 
policy. A basic requirement for implementation of this policy is that:  
 42
National and NATO authorities are encouraged to develop, agree and 
implement concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs which will enable 
them to achieve and maintain interoperability. This requires the 
establishment of the necessary levels of compatibility, interchangeability 
or commonality in operational, procedural, materiel, technical and 
administrative fields (p. 2). 
As a NATO member, Bulgaria must comply with requirements not only for its 
forces presently designated for the Alliance, but also for the entire Bulgarian Armed 
Forces.  
B. NATO SOF 
1. General Overview 
National SOF within NATO have proven their value being employed in various 
allied operations. SOF is a valuable asset for conducting low visibility activities in 
sensitive or denied areas. They are mobile, highly-trained, easily networked with other 
forces, and can be logistically self-sufficient for short periods. In addition, SOF is highly 
flexible and adaptable. However, one of the greatest challenges for NSOF constituent 
nations is that they are not organized as a single military entity that can operate under 
NATO command. Gompert and Smith (2006) found that although NATO has 
occasionally requested U.S. and allied national SOF in response to contingencies, such as 
those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, these forces do not have the appropriate operational 
capabilities for joint operations or the requisite level of preparedness (p. 1). The reason 
for that is the lack of a unifying and commanding military organization for national SOF 
within NATO.  
Thus, what NATO does best – enhancing and melding multilateral 
capabilities for combined action – it has not done with regard to SOF. 
These scarce, high value forces are increasingly essential to the shared 
security interests of members on both sides of the Atlantic, and SOF of all 
countries could benefit from working together. NATO can improve in this 
area and should (p. 2).  
A NATO ministerial meeting held June 8th, 2006 in Brussels confirmed the need 
for changes in favor of the development of SOF capabilities. “The Alliance’s planning 
process will be increasingly geared to ensuring that NATO can conduct a greater number 
of the more likely smaller-scale operations than in the past” (NATO Sets New Level of 
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Ambition for Operations, 2006). One may suggest that smaller scale operations may 
increasingly employ special operations, and that adjustments may be related to 
incorporate specific planning processes of SOF. Further support for the growing 
importance of special operations in NATO was provided in an interview given on July 
10Pth P, 2006, as the newly assigned Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff General Zlatan 
Stoykov stated that during the NATO meeting the issue of NSOF had been raised, and 
that further discussions would be carried out during the next NATO ministerial meeting 
(Valkov, 2006). Finally, in the article The NATO Riga Summit: A Renewed Commitment 
to Transformation, Simon Serfaty states that one of the topics during the next NATO 
meeting will be “the coordination of Special Operations Forces to improve their 
interoperability for future NATO missions” (2006). Clearly, the subject of NSOF stands 
out as a NATO agenda for the development of “new-era mission” capabilities. One might 
argue that the use of SOF is primarily dictated by national issues and concerns. Yet when 
a state becomes a member of the Alliance and agrees to abide by the proposed 
regulations, it should follow the principles approved by NATO, even if they contradict 
the internal bureaucratic interests of the national military.  
There is a requirement for NATO to build a new unifying structure for managing 
its SOF units. The advantage of this approach is that, on one hand, it will increase NATO 
operational capabilities during low-intensity crises. On the other hand, abundant national 
SOF already exist and the cost for NSOF headquarters, training facilities, new equipment, 
and exercises would be moderate. In return, NATO would develop a valuable capacity to 
swiftly respond to crises that demand precision, low visibility, and proportional response 
(Binnendijk, Gompert, & Kugler, 2005, p. 6).  
2. Overarching Documents on NSOF 
Although presently NSOF is not organized under a unified NATO command 
structure and no specific doctrine on special operations is available, their employment in 
joint operations is defined by Chapter 8 – Special Operations of the Allied Joint Doctrine 
– AJP 01(B) 2002. The cornerstone document for NATO policy regarding special 
operations is MC 437 – NАТО Sресiа1 Operations Policy. Moreover, NATO 
Headquarters is currently developing a new doctrine, AJP 3.5, which will deal 
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exclusively with NSOF. Although limited in availability, there is a general basis for 
analyses of the NSOF concept of operations. AJP-01(B) provides valuable insights on 
what NATO regulations and standards regarding SOF organization, command and 
control (C2), and employment should be expected for the Special Forces units of the 
newly admitted members of the Alliance.  
As mentioned in Chapter II, Bulgaria contributes to the NATO collective defense 
arrangement with 21 combat and combat service support units that must be operational 
by NATO standards no later than 2010. According to the Force Goal EG 3520, BSOF is 
to commit a SOF Task Force to the NATO Response Forces (NRF) (68th SFBDE, 2006).  
NRF is a rapidly deployable multinational unit made up of land, air, 
maritime and special forces components. Numbering 24,000 troops when 
it reaches its full operational capability in October 2006, it will be able to 
start to deploy after five days’ notice and sustain itself for operations 
lasting 30 days or longer if resupplied. The NRF will be able to deploy 
worldwide, as and when decided by the North Atlantic Council 
(Interoperability for Joint Operations, 2006, p. 6). 
Considering the importance of the BSOF participation in a unit with such a high 
level of combat readiness, the Bulgarian military leadership must be prepared to comply 
with the NATO Special Operations Policy. Moreover, the future rotation of national units 
within NRF will require NATO standards to be adopted by all BSOF units to insure the 
smooth rotation of the subsequent BSOF Task Forces. Although most documents 
regarding special operations are classified or under development, AJP 01(B) can clarify 
the NATO standards for SOF for the purpose of this thesis.  
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN AJP-01(B) 
“The primary objective of AJP-01(B) is to provide a ‘capstone’ doctrine for the 
planning, execution and support of Allied joint operations. The publication is intended for 
use primarily by commanders and staffs at the operational level, but could be used at any 
level as a reference” (NATO, AJP-01(B), 2002).  This definition of AJP-01(B) makes it a 
credible source for outlining basic NATO standards for special operations. Any shortfalls 
found in this document will likely be compensated by a more specific and comprehensive 
doctrine for NATO Special Operations – AJP 3.5 – which is currently under 
development. According to the former Chief of the G-2 department of the former BSOF 
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Command – at present a student at the National Defense University, Washington, DC –
who had contributed to the draft of AJP 3.5, it is very similar to the 2003 U.S. Joint 
Publication 3-05 – Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (Personal Communication, 
September 23, 2006). This similarity is easily substantiated by the significant role and 
influence of the U.S. in NATO. 
Chapter 8 of AJP-01(B) “summarizes the tasks, characteristics and principles of 
employment of Special Operations Forces (SOF), and provides guidance to commanders 
and staffs on the essential factors involved in the planning of special operations in the 
context of allied joint operations” (NATO, 2002, p. 8-1).  This part of the doctrine 
includes a definition of special operations, basic tasks, characteristics, principles of 
employment, and planning considerations in special operations. The following section 
will outline the most important attributes of special operations and SOF employed in 
NATO combined joint operations.  
1. Definition of Special Operations 
AJP-01(B) defines special operations as: 
Military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained 
and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of 
employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are 
conducted across the full range of military operations (peace, crisis and 
conflict) independently or in co-ordination with operations of conventional 
forces to achieve military, political, economic and psychological 
objectives or a combination thereof. Political-military considerations may 
require covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of 
physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations 
(NATO, 2002, p. 8-1).  
According to the definition, these operations require unique forces and special 
techniques that do not have conventional alternatives. Furthermore, these activities can be 
conducted in a timely fashion to achieve a wide range of not only military but political 
and economic objectives as well, making them a highly valued resource for the 
employing authority. Special operations conducted by U.S. SOF during Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 include most of the characteristics described 
above; and similarly achieved unique political and military success for the U.S. Although 
it was not flawless, the commitment of U.S. SOF in Afghanistan proved that SOF can 
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offer a suitable response to adversaries like the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda. The cost-
benefit ratio was exceedingly in favor of the U.S. In an interview dated March 17Pth P, 2003, 
Doctor John Arquilla stated that for about two months, with the participation of about 
300 SOF operatives and with the support of U.S. Air Forces and indigenous militias, the 
Taliban regime was defeated (Kreisler, 2003).  
2. Special Operations Tasks 
AJP-01(B) outlines only three special operations tasks: special surveillance and 
reconnaissance, direct action, and military assistance. Comparing them to the nine SO 
tasks comprised by the US JP 3-05, the number of NATO tasks seems limited. However, 
AJP-01(8) states that these tasks are assigned to SOF in the context of allied joint 
operations, which implies that additional tasks, such as counterterrorism or 
unconventional warfare,  may be conducted under specific circumstances. A larger set of 
NSOF tasks will likely be addressed in AJP 3.5.  
3. Characteristics of Special Operations 
AJP-01(B) defines a number of characteristics of special operations, but the 
following are of greatest relevance. Special operations are:  
• Usually of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, 
critical targets which offer the potential for high returns. 
• Often politico-military in nature and require understanding, oversight and 
full support at Alliance/national level. They demand detailed planning and 
co-ordination with other commands, services, government and non-
governmental agencies. 
• Generally dependent on responsive and specialized maritime, land and air 
support. 
• Usually covert or discreet in nature. 
• Frequently undertaken when the use of conventional forces is, for military 
or political reasons, neither appropriate nor feasible. 
• Usually conducted at great distance from established support bases, 
requiring sophisticated communications and means of infiltration, 
exfiltration and support to penetrate and recover from hostile, denied or 
politically sensitive areas. 
• May require patient, long-term commitment and detailed knowledge of the 
onditions, languages and culture of the operational area. 
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• Dependent on discriminate and precise use of force, often requiring the 
rapid development, acquisition and employment of special weapons and 
equipment. 
• Dependent on detailed intelligence, intimate and responsive C2, thorough 
planning, decentralized execution (by those who did the planning) and 
rigorous, detailed rehearsal (NATO, 2002, pp. 8-4 – 8-5). 
 
All these characteristics distinguish special operations from conventional 
operations. If most of these features are not applied to special operations and SOF, the 
value of such operations and the efficiency of the corresponding forces will be drastically 
decreased. Likewise, if the special operations conducted by BSOF do not subscribe to the 
same characteristics, there is less potential of a successful outcome. The failure of a 
special operation could result in considerable negative consequences for Bulgarian 
national security. In 1980, Operation Eagle Claw was launched for the liberation of U.S. 
hostages held in Iran. The operation lacked the majority of the latter characteristics, and 
thus led to a tragic fiasco during the initial stage of the military activities. As a result, the 
mission was canceled which created significant negative international and internal 
consequences for the U.S. government (Vandenbroucke, 1993, p. 134-135).  
4. Principles of Employment of Special Operations Forces 
Considering that special operations are unconventional and complex activities, the 
procedures and techniques for their execution must be simple and direct. The 
commanding authority must clearly define and communicate its intent to the lowest 
tactical level through the shortest chain of C2 (NATO, 2002, p. 8-5). AJP-01(B) defines 
the following principles of SOF employment:  
• SOF should be assigned to execute only high value tasks. 
• SOF should have full access to all possible intelligence sources. 
• SOF should be organized and used under clear command and control 
relationships. 
• SOF should be provided with broad and clear mission directives. 
• SOF activities must be surrounded by paramount security.  
These principles constitute the foundation for the craft of special operations.  
Keeping in mind that SOF is a highly valuable and difficult to produce asset, its potential 
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should not be wasted for strategically or operationally irrelevant targets. The 1970 U.S. 
Raid on Son Tay Camp in Vietnam proved that without timely, detailed, and tailored 
intelligence, even the best planned and executed special operations may fail 
(Vandenbroucke, 1993, p. 70). Usually operations conducted by SOF require rapid 
response; therefore, the chain of command for SOF should be short and clear. That is 
why in the structure of the NATO Combined Joint Task Force, along with the land, air, 
and maritime component commands, the special operations component command has its 
independent position (NATO, 2002, p. 1-9). The elevation of U.S. SOF to the joint level 
was imposed upon the U.S. Armed Forces by the civilian leadership. The 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated the creation of a unified special operations command 
with direct command link to the U.S. Department of Defense and provided it with an 
independent funding program (USSOCOM, 2002, p. 5). “This step has given the United 
States an exceptionally cost-effective instrument of military action and military strategy” 
(Gompert & Smith, 2006). The relatively successful employment and performance of 
U.S. SOF after the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act could be an example 
for appropriate SOF management for all NATO members, including Bulgaria. Expanding 
on the C2 principle, the necessity for clear mission directives is determined by the 
peculiarities of the centralized planning and the decentralized execution of special 
operations. SOF can not efficiently operate without applying “sufficient flexibility to 
react to an adversary’s activities, and the necessary authority to adjust the SOF plan to 
cope with changing conditions during the conduct of their mission” (NATO, 2002, p. 8-
7). Finally, but no less important, the principle of security facilitates not only the 
successful execution of a special operation but the effectiveness of the whole planning 
and preparation process. The principles of employment of SOF are mutually related. The 
violation of one of them affects the implementation of the others, thus decreasing the 
probability for success of a SO. 
Chapter 8 of AJP-01(B) concludes with planning considerations in special 
operations.  This section encompasses elements such as employment, integration, 
security, planning, intelligence, logistics, etc. The most essential of them have been 
already discussed in the previous sections and the rest are not essential to this thesis.  
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AJP-01(B) provides a concise and accurate outline of NATO Special Operations 
in the context of Allied Joint Operations.  Although the standards for national SOF units 
are assigned in specific classified documents, AJP-01(B) defines the basic requirements 
for NSOF. When compared to the U.S. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, there are 
numerous similarities between the NATO and U.S. Doctrine. Recall NATO policy on 
interoperability and standardization – all members that participate with national 
components in the defense system of the Alliance must implement NATO doctrine and 
procedures. Therefore, the Bulgarian military leadership, representing a NATO member 
state with SOF units participating in the allied force structure, should develop a new 
Bulgarian Special Operations Doctrine and manage BSOF according to the requirements 
of Chapter 8 – Special Operations in the AJP-01(B) and NATO Special Operations 
Doctrine – AJP 3.5. Bulgaria greatly relies on the security provided by NATO; hence, the 
development of BSOF in accordance with NATO standards is not only in favor of the 
Alliance, but also serves to enhance Bulgarian national security.  
D. SUMMARY  
NATO is a vital pillar for Bulgarian national security. It supports the national 
interests of both its new and old members. The growing number of participating countries 
and the changing nature of contemporary threats impose gradual transformation within 
the Alliance. The acquisition of specific operational capabilities is another important goal 
for NATO, and the development of NSOF is a central objective for this process of 
transformation.  In the near future, NSOF is expected to be organized under a unified 
NATO command and will be sustained in accordance with the latest NATO Special 
Operations Doctrine. Considering the strict standardization policy for achieving 
interoperability within the Alliance, all members should adopt and implement the 
doctrine and policies of NATO. In that regard, the Bulgarian military leadership should 
adjust its policy on special operations to address the standards of the Alliance in order to 
develop viable BSOF capabilities not only to satisfy NATO requirements, but to enhance 
Bulgarian national security as well. Considering the organizational position of BSOF 
within the Bulgarian military hierarchy and recent downsizing of BSOF, a substantial 
discord exists between the present management and capabilities of BSOF and the current  
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NATO standards, principles, and characteristics for the employment of NSOF. Therefore, 
the gaps between Bulgarian and NATO employment of special operations should be 








VI. SHORTFALLS BETWEEN BSOF CAPABILITIES, NATIONAL 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND NATO STANDARDS 
As aforementioned in the previous chapters, according to Bulgarian political and 
military official documents, BSOF is considered as a small but significant guardian for 
Bulgarian national and global security. Moreover, CEDESOF states that BSOF is the 
most important component of the Bulgarian Armed Forces (2000, p. 25). As such, it is 
part of the national and allied defense system; thus, anticipating the challenges of 
contemporary threats for Bulgarian national and global security. 
Analyzing the risks for global security, Sloan (2005) found that conventional 
strategists will need time to adapt to threats like terrorism (p. xxiii). Furthermore, in 
2001, the U.S. combat experience in Afghanistan demonstrated that when U.S. forces 
were not able to accomplish the conventional plan quick enough, U.S. SOF proved its 
utility as a valuable cost-effective unconventional military asset by successfully defeating 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2005, p. 9). According to the U.S. 
National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP for WOT) Annex C, 
Operations “…establishes Commander of United States Special Operations Forces 
Command as the supported command for the GWT” (2006. p. 28). Apparently, the 
asymmetric and irregular nature of modern security risks requires a more flexible, 
innovative, and unconventional military approach for a crisis response; such an approach 
may successfully be provided by national SOF. Therefore, BSOF, as a military asset with 
unconventional capabilities, should fully address the requirements of Bulgarian national 
and military security strategies.  
As a NATO member, Bulgaria faces new responsibilities that contribute to the 
collective defense of the Alliance. In exchange for the security offered by NATO and for  
future participation in its operations, the state should synchronize its operational military 
capabilities with the requirements of the Alliance. Despite limited national resources, 
Bulgarian security is of a paramount concern, and it should be protected by relevant 
military assets. In order to be a rapid response military asset capable of swift projection 
abroad in the interest of protecting national and global security, BSOF must also address 
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the requirements of NATO SOF (NSOF). This is not a bureaucratic reflex, but an 
alignment of BSOF with the latest doctrinal developments in NATO Special Operations. 
With respect to this thesis, if gaps between capabilities of BSOF and the National and 
Military Security Strategies and NATO regulations exist, the identified shortfalls must be 
properly analyzed and rectified.  
A. BSOF AND CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS FOR BULGARIAN 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGY 
1. SOF as a Valuable Asset Protecting National Security  
As discussed in Chapter I, one of the concerns for Bulgarian national security is 
the involvement of the state in a conventional conflict triggered by its neighbors or in a 
crisis initiated in the adjacent unstable regions such as the Middle East, Caucasus, Central 
Asia, and North Africa. The Bulgarian NSC asserts that the probability for a large scale 
conflict in the Balkan region is small (1998). However, this possibility should be 
estimated and planned for from a political and military perspective. In that regard, the 
ANSR states that the Bulgarian defense is no longer directed at the neutralization of a 
specific enemy. The Bulgarian Armed Forces is expected to develop required operational 
capabilities in response to contemporary risks and threats for national security (2006). 
The smaller probability for conventional wars and the growing danger posed by 
terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and WMD, radical Islamism, and the 
occurrence of low-intensity conflicts in close proximity to the Republic of Bulgaria 
reduces the significance of large conventional forces for national security. Therefore, the 
Bulgarian political leadership and military authorities launched programs for the 
modernization of the armed forces directed to the establishment of smaller, multi-
purpose, flexible, and rapidly deployable military units. Moreover, the dynamic global 
and local security environment predetermined by predominantly asymmetric threats 
requires unconventional response by forces with the latter characteristics. For example, 
the U.S. has chosen the following solution:  
The small size, unique capabilities, and self-sufficiency (for short periods 
of time) of SOF operational units provide the United States with feasible 




degree of political liability or risk of escalation normally associated with 
employment of inherently larger or more visible conventional forces (JP 3-
05, p. vii).  
Moreover, special operations can successfully be used in support of the foreign 
policy of a state. JP 3-05 asserts:  
SO can be designed and conducted to influence the will of foreign 
leadership and/or populations to create conditions favorable to US 
strategic aims or objectives. Alternatively, SO may be principally 
offensive, of high physical and political risk, and directed at high-value, 
and often time-sensitive targets (p. vii). 
The listed characteristics portray SOF as an asset that can be beneficially utilized 
by both political and military authorities not only in response to a crisis, but in proactive 
low-visibility operations for preventing an emergency from occurring. According to 
official political and military sources such as the National Security Concept and Military 
Doctrine and Strategy, Bulgarian national security requires a similar set of 
unconventional military capabilities. Moreover, according to the analysis of the 
aforementioned documents in Chapter III, the Bulgarian politico-military leadership 
relies on BSOF as a military asset capable of supporting national security policy. If only 
properly planned and conducted, can special operations save valuable national resources 
while protecting Bulgarian national security and strategic interests.  As a minimum, to 
use BSOF for conducting special operations against high-value and time-sensitive targets 
with political or strategic military importance in the interest of Bulgarian national 
security, it must be suitably organized, trained, equipped, and employed. BSOF must be 
provided with the latest detailed intelligence in order to successfully plan and conduct an 
ordered operation. Furthermore, BSOF units must possess the necessary strategic airlift 
capabilities to swiftly reach the assigned area of operation within the state or abroad. 
These units should be equipped with the most advanced weapons and communication 
assets. Although Special Forces are relatively self-sufficient for short periods, they 
should be provided with requisite integral logistic support. Comparing BSOF capabilities 
with the requirements listed above, there are several significant shortfalls.  
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2. Shortfalls between the Requirements of Bulgarian National Security 
and the Capabilities of BSOF 
a. Inappropriate Command and Control of BSOF  
“Successful execution of SO requires clear, responsive, command and 
control (C2) by an appropriate special operations forces (SOF) C2 element” (JP 3-05, 
2003, p. viii). Special operations directed at high-value and time-sensitive targets require 
swift, centralized planning and direct line of command from the highest political or 
military authority to the lowest unit, which will conduct the operation. Logically, this 
prerequisite suggests that BSOF should be organizationally located as close as possible to 
the highest military commanding body – in this case, and as a minimum – the General 
Staff (GS).  
The General Staff is a main body for strategic command and 
control of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria in 
peacetime and war. In war it directs the Armed Forces’ transition 
from peacetime to wartime status, the establishment of the 
defensive groupings, the preparation and conduct of the operations 
and the territorial defense. The General Staff activities and 
functions are designed to … ensure the accomplishment of the 
tasks as determined by the national security and defense guiding 
documents (Military Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria, 2002). 
Contrary to the latter notion, BSOF is organized under the direct C2 of the 
Chief of the Army (CEDESOF, 2000, p. 16). Thus, the line of command for BSOF 
consists of several organizational layers. In case of emergent employment of BSOF, the 
orders will be issued from the Chief of the Ministry of Defense to the GS; the Chief of 
the GS will relay them to the Chief of the Army; he will alert the BSOF department 
within the Army Headquarters; and finally the assigned unit will receive the orders for 
detailed planning. With this long chain of C2, an urgent SOF response to a crisis is 
almost impossible. Alternatively, according to the Organization Design theory of 
Mintzberg, a dynamic, hostile, and relatively complex environment requires flexible 
organizations with centralized control and flat hierarchical design, capable to rapidly 
respond to emergencies (1981, p. 5). As previously discussed, terrorism is envisioned as 
the most probable threat for Bulgarian national security. Moreover, crises related to 
asymmetric threats usually create a dynamic and relatively complex security 
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environment; thus, requiring a very high level of operational readiness and centralized 
national control. Therefore, with the present line of C2, BSOF is sub-optimally 
configured and less likely to address immediate threats to national security. BSOF can 
successfully conduct proactive special operations at a political or strategic military level 
only if its chain of command is compressed and unequivocal. 
Moreover, Bulgaria relies on insufficient CT assets provided by its civilian 
law-enforcement agencies. 
Answering to the questions of the UN Counterterrorism Committee 
whether Special Operations Forces activities against terrorist 
threats are envisioned in the implementation of the Bulgarian 
Integrated Counterterrorism Strategy, the Government of the 
Republic of Bulgaria only replied that “There is an ongoing 
process of providing additional equipment for the Specialized 
Tactical Rapid Response Units, their training, and work on 
secondary legislation regulating their operation” (Fourth Report on 
The Activities of The Republic of Bulgaria To Counter Terrorism, 
2004, p. 6). 
In this answer, the Bulgarian leadership refers only to the CT tactical units 
of the law-enforcement agencies, while the ANSR states that military forces, particularly 
BSOF, constitute a major CT asset (2005). Moreover, if in response to terrorist threats 
Bulgarian authorities primarily rely on the CT units of the national law-enforcement 
agencies, the CT effort could achieve limited success. Normally, these units do not 
possess organic assets for a strategic long-range projection and capabilities to operate in 
hostile territory and inaccessible terrain. Alternatively, BSOF at least has developed 
appropriate tactical capabilities to be independently employed in CT operations under the 
latter conditions. Moreover, it can be supported with air or maritime projection assets 
provided by the armed services of the Bulgarian Armed Forces.   
The significance of this issue is based on the probability of a terrorist 
attack, for example, hostage taking. If such a crisis occurs within the territory of the state, 
the CT units of the police are more likely to be employed because they are properly 
tailored to operate in urban environments and easily accessible areas. However, if the 
hostage crisis takes place in a remote forbidding area, inaccessible terrain or abroad, then 
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the latter CT units could not be effectively employed. They lack appropriate projection 
assets, training, and equipment to conduct hostage rescue operations under the 
aforementioned conditions. Alternatively, the Bulgarian Military Doctrine states that 
military units, particularly BSOF, can be employed in response to terrorist threats 
domestically or abroad (MD, 2002). In the case of the kidnapping of a high-profile 
Bulgarian political or military representative in the mountain areas of Albania or Kosovo, 
for instance, and if the local authorities lack capabilities to conduct a hostage rescue 
operation, they could give permission to the Bulgarian government to initiate an 
independent CT operation. Under such circumstances, the best choice for the Bulgarian 
leadership could be the employment of BSOF. Recalling the present C2 arrangements for 
BSOF and the limited CT capabilities of the law-enforcement agencies, Bulgaria does not 
possess effective assets to address the challenges of terrorism. These limited CT 
capabilities contradict the requirements of the National Security and Military Strategies. 
Therefore, in order to be developed as an effective CT asset, BSOF should be organized 
and employed according to the suggested standards for C2.  
b. The Lack of a Joint and Unified Command  
The Bulgarian CEDESOF, written in 2000, is the only military document 
which directly refers to BSOF. Presently, the Bulgarian military leadership is developing 
an updated Doctrine for Special Operations. According to the CEDESOF, BSOF includes 
only Army units; in case of necessity, these units can be augmented with Navy Special 
Forces detachments. Additionally, combat service support will be provided by Army 
Engineer Corps and NBC units; strategic aerial and amphibious projections will be 
ensured by the Air Force and the Navy (2001, p. 16). SOF units of the armed services and 
the necessary supporting projection assets are not unified under a single special 
operations command. Moreover, as previously outlined, in June 2006, the BSOF 
Command for Army SOF was downsized and reorganized into a small department under 
Army HQ C2. Recalling the dismal performance of U.S. SOF prior to the implementation 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, one may suggest that the lack of an independent 
commanding body that unifies the Special Forces units from all services of the Bulgarian 
Armed Forces is a factor that could significantly decrease the operational capabilities of 
BSOF. The present posture of BSOF is less likely to address Bulgarian national security 
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requirements. BSOF is also not aligned with the recommendations outlined in CEDESOF 
for the further development of these forces.  
In Chapter 10 – Vision for Development of BSOF – CEDESOF states that 
BSOF is one of the most important components of the Bulgarian Armed Forces; 
therefore, it will be further developed according to the contemporary special operations 
trends, the doctrine, and procedures of NATO (2001, p. 25). As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, AJP-01 B asserts special operations principles and regulations that are 
in total disagreement with the latest changes in BSOF. While the Allied Joint Doctrine 
states that NSOF should be organized under a unified component command at the joint 
level, BSOF is organized and managed in an opposite way. Moreover, U.S. JP 3-05 
supports NATO AJP-01 B stating that “SO are inherently joint. Although they may be 
conducted as a single-Service operation, most are planned and executed as a joint 
operation. SO routinely require joint support and coordination” (JP 3-05, 2003, p. I-2). 
Being at a lower level as an Army subordinated organization, BSOF will be insufficiently 
provided with vital intelligence, aerial or naval projection assets, and specific 
technological service support. The long and complex line of command and coordination 
between services will hinder the swift planning, preparation, and execution of special 
operations not only against asymmetric threats, but during conventional campaigns as 
well. The following examples portray U.S. experiences in the improper C2 of SOF. In 
1980, During Operation Eagle Claw and in 1983, during Operation Urgent Fury, U.S. 
SOF were employed improperly as a part of a large mixed military unit, with “confused 
JTF’s chain of command” (Vandenbrucke, 1993, p. 134) or with “little or no integration 
of the units of special operations forces with one another or with the conventional 
commanders” (Marquis, 1997, p. 106). Furthermore, Operations Desert Shield and Desert 
Storm were the biggest military campaigns since World War II in which U.S. SOF were 
deployed. 
Nevertheless, although SOF had a useful role to play in the war, 
they were essentially marginal players. But the Iraq case is 
important because it illustrates the dangers and difficulties of 
employing Special Operations Forces on a conventional battlefield 
(USDOD, 1992, p. J-1). 
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c. The Friction in Operational Planning. 
The CEDESOF states that the broad planning for operations that are 
assigned to BSOF is carried out by Army HQ. Only detailed planning of specific tasks in 
an operation is a responsibility of the former BSOF Command (presently a department 
level organization) (2001, p. 22). Such planning arrangements may cause conflict in 
employment of BSOF. Usually the senior military organization (e.g., Army HQ) 
monopolizes the decision-making process during the planning phase, potentially issuing 
inappropriate orders regarding the combat employment of BSOF units. Considering that 
the BSOF Department is directly subordinated to Army HQ, it is more likely to be forced 
to implement imposed recommendations or to execute issued orders, instead of equally 
participating in the planning and decision-making process. American SOF were similarly 
treated prior to the creation of USSOCOM. Vandenbroucke explains the reasons for the 
latter bureaucratic phenomenon: 
Part of the problem is the bureaucratic parochialism, or the natural 
tendency of organizational units to focus chiefly on their own 
primary missions and entailed needs and practices. As a result, 
individual military services often pay limited attention to the needs 
of other services with which they are periodically called upon to 
work and to the requirements of smooth interaction (1993, p. 158). 
Moreover, Army HQ does not have its own SO expertise. Therefore, a 
potential outcome is special operations improperly planned and BSOF misused not only 
during a conventional campaign, but also in a peacetime crisis planning process. For 
prevention of such negative consequences in the U.S. Armed Forces, JP 3-05 states: 
“SOF are most effective when SO are fully integrated into the overall plan (war or 
Military Operations Other Than War). Successful execution of SO requires clear, 
responsive C2 by an appropriate SOF C2 element” (2003, p. III-1). If this standard is not 
fulfilled, the principle of decentralization is more likely to be violated. “While SO 
personnel should be included in centralized planning at the combatant commander and 
subordinate JFC levels, successful SO requires decentralized planning and execution for 
individual missions. Independent judgment and effective coordination by SOF leaders at 
every echelon are vital to successful SO” (p. I-9). BSOF is an Army subordinated 
organization, and its planning and decision-making process is conducted at lower than the 
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joint level; therefore, it can be more readily influenced or interfered with by the 
conventional considerations of Army planners. Lieutenant Colonel Yavor Matteev – a 
former Chief of the G-2 department of the former BSOF Command, currently a student at 
the National Defense University, Washington, DC – states that during annual joint 
exercises of the Bulgarian Armed Forces the Army HQ usually plans the BSOF 
employment without any coordination with SOF representatives. The assigned tasks for 
BSOF in support of conventional operations are directly ordered by the superior military 
authority (Personal Communication, September 9, 2006). 
Such interference is a normal bureaucratic reflex for organizations with a 
long vertical hierarchy. Although general principles and rules are enforced, senior 
bureaucratic organizations impose their will and interests over the subordinated units, 
often, disregarding their level of expertise. Bolman and Deal (2003) found that “the usual 
mistake is assuming that the right idea and legitimate authority ensure success” (p. 228). 
Military organizations are conservative bureaucratic structures with relatively centralized 
control. The major difference between military and civilian organizations is the level of 
submission and obedience to the formal rules. Although military organizations are based 
on the strict compliance with the designated regulations and almost complete 
subordination to the superior authority, they are permeated by inter-service “political 
rivalry” and strife for bureaucratic domination. Such organizational environment is more 
likely to create hostility which may result in irrational decisions and incorrect choices 
(Allison, 1999). Furthermore, inappropriate planning and decision-making may 
negatively affect the execution of a special operation with potentially dangerous and 
costly consequences for Bulgarian national security. U.S. experience in planning and 
execution of strategic special operations before 1986 is exemplified by the following 
observations: 
The Bay of Pigs and the Iran rescue mission were disasters that 
exacted in a high price in human life and US prestige… Moreover, 
close examination of these episodes confirms that…recurrent 
problems have plagued US strategic special operations. Faulty 
intelligence, poor interagency and interservice cooperation and 
coordination, provision of inadequate advice to decision makers, 
wishful thinking, and overcontrol of mission execution by officials 
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far removed from the theater of operations have repeatedly 
jeopardized the ability of the United States to conduct such 
missions successfully (Vandenbroucke, 1993, p. 152). 
d. Misusing BSOF in Peace Support Operations  
As aforementioned, the Bulgarian NSC and MS envision the deployment 
of Bulgarian military units, particularly BSOF, in Peace Support Operations as a 
significant prerequisite in support of national security. The CEDESOF asserts that “If 
BSOF is employed independently to conduct an operation, then the general planning is a 
responsibility of the BSOF Department, and the detailed planning is completed by the 
assigned BSOF unit" (2001, p. 22). Yet up to now, BSOF was employed only once as 
part of the Bulgarian Light Infantry Battalion, which participated in the post-conflict 
recovery of Iraq in 2003 to 2005. Although it was an excellent opportunity for BSOF to 
take part in the operation as an independent task force, the Army chiefs decided to 
establish ad-hoc SOF teams from individual volunteers and to directly subordinate them 
to the Battalion Commander. However, the Battalion Commander did not have the 
expertise and the HQ capabilities to appropriately employ them. Instead of conducting 
SO and supporting the operational activities of the Bulgarian contingent through 
accomplishment of tasks such as SR, FID, DA or PSYOP, BSOF’s ad-hoc teams were 
tasked for very important person (VIP) protection, regular patrolling, convoying, 
operating checkpoints, and other conventional tasks (68th SFBDE, 2006). This case is an 
example of how BSOF is misused and mismanaged by its senior commanding authority 
represented by Army HQ. Such an inappropriate employment not only conventionalized 
BSOF, but also deteriorated the security of the Bulgarian battalion in Iraq which caused 
negative political implications for Bulgarian domestic and foreign policy. 
In December 2003, after an act of terrorism against the Bulgarian base in 
Kerbala, five Bulgarians were killed and dozens were wounded. This episode created 
significant public tension, and the government was pressured to withdraw the Bulgarian 
contingent from Iraq. Although the battalion was not withdrawn, the tragedy created a 
national political crisis which affected the military credibility and the international image 
of the state. If BSOF was properly used as an independent task force for executing SO  
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and supporting the operational activities of the Bulgarian battalion in Iraq, the level of 
security in the region would have been higher and the bombing of the Bulgarian base in 
Kerbala might have not occurred.  
e. The Lack of Independent Funding for BSOF 
The subordination of BSOF under Army command entails another 
negative consequence. According to the CEDESOF, one of the priorities for the 
development and modernization of BSOF is its procurement with the latest weapons, 
special technical assets, and advanced equipment (2001, p. 7). Moreover, some of the 
missions assigned to BSOF may be conducted in isolated and politically sensitive 
regions; therefore, they will require complex technical mechanisms for C2 and 
communication, advanced assets for aerial or amphibious infiltration and extraction, and 
reliable systems for logistic support (p. 7). The fulfillment of these requirements 
facilitates the successful accomplishment of special operations, especially in an 
environment of continuously evolving irregular warfare such as terrorism. Although the 
procurement of BSOF with special weapons and equipment is not very costly, in 
comparison to the acquisition costs of the other armed services, the Army is less likely to 
pay the bill of a subordinated “step-child” organization. On one hand, it is interested in 
obtaining funds dedicated for its junior member, but on the other hand, the same money 
will be easily shifted away from its beneficiary as soon as a unique or unexpected 
financial need arises.  
This phenomenon is explained by Bolman and Deal: “Inside and outside 
any organization, a variety of interest groups, each with its own agenda, compete for 
scarce resources. There is never enough to give all parties what they want, so there will 
always be struggles” (2003, p. 327). Therefore, one of the important results of the U.S. 
Goldwater-Nichols Act after 1986 was the establishment of an independent financial 
program for U.S. SOF. To decrease the “conventional” interference with the SOF budget, 
the Congress created a new Major Force Program (MFP 11 – the so-called “SOF 
checkbook”) (USSOCOM, 2002). Having gained organizational and financial 
independence, U.S. SOF continued its evolution as a new, progressive military 
organization defending national security and strategic interests of the U.S. Alternately, by 
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being a subordinated organization, BSOF is more likely to be stripped of its resources in 
favor of the Army. This negative trend leaves BSOF operationally undermined and 
inherently undersupplied. Consequently, the reduced SO capabilities may deteriorate 
Bulgarian national security and could negatively affect the strategic interest of the state.  
B. BSOF CAPABILITES AND NATO STANDARDS 
The previous chapter outlined the NATO concept for Joint Special Operations. As 
previously mentioned, NATO is a strategic military alliance for Bulgarian national 
security. Since 2004, the Bulgarian defense has been planned in the context of Article 5 – 
the collective defense of NATO. Therefore, for effective and successful membership, 
Bulgaria should adopt NATO military regulations and develop its military according to 
the standards of the Alliance. Considering that Bulgaria has been a NATO member for 
more than two years, its armed forces, particularly BSOF, should have already progressed 
with the process of military integration.  
1. NATO Principles for Special Operations and BSOF Requirements 
In regards to the special operations standards posed by the AJP-01 (B), BSOF has 
several substantial differences that may cause friction during its participation in NATO 
combined joint operations. The shortfalls between BSOF and the regulations for NATO 
SOF stand out in the principles of employment of NSOF. One of these principles states 
that “SOF should be organized and used under clear command and control relationships” 
(AJP-01 (B), 2002). Based on the previously discussed shortfall between BSOF 
capabilities and requirements of Bulgarian national security and military strategy, in 
reference to the C2 arrangements between BSOF and Army HQ, there is a discord 
between Bulgarian military regulations and NATO standards. For maximum utilization of 
its military assets, in the structure of NATO Combined Joint Task Force, along with the 
land, air, and maritime component commands, special operations component command 
has its equal-in-rights place (2002, p. 1-9). The reason for that is similar to the previously 
suggested explanation regarding BSOF C2 arrangements. The fact that NATO and U.S. 
Armed Forces have similar C2 arrangements for their SOF is an unambiguous signal for 
the Bulgarian political and military leadership. Considering the combat experience and 
operational capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and NATO, the solution for their SOF 
C2 is predetermined by a rational military estimate for superior combat efficiency.  
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The violation of the principle for compressed and unequivocal C2 entails 
infringements of the other SO principles. For example, a complicated chain of command, 
placing SOF under subordination of a single armed service, will more likely encourage 
commanders to employ SOF units to execute low value tasks. Moreover, if it is not 
positioned at the joint level, SOF will not have full access to all possible intelligence 
sources and requisite resources. Having several commanding layers, SOF will not be 
provided with the required operational security to plan, prepare, and execute a SO. 
Therefore, the principle of compressed and unequivocal C2 for SOF is of paramount 
importance; if it is violated, a SO is much less likely to be successful. Thus, BSOF 
organizational design and line of C2 should be tailored in accordance with the latest 
trends of U.S. and NATO SOF transformation. Once again, Bulgaria is a NATO member, 
and its armed forces should adapt the doctrinal standards of the Alliance. This also 
enhances unit proficiency – BSOF should train as it fights. Alternatively, the 
implementation of double standards for employment of BSOF – in NATO operations and 
for national needs – is inappropriate and unacceptable dichotomy. If the Bulgarian Armed 
Forces, particularly BSOF, fail to meet NATO standards, the national military units will 
probably be rejected from participation in the allied forces, which may risk the 
membership in NATO, military credibility, and the national security of the Republic of 
Bulgaria.  
2. NATO Requirements and BSOF Roles 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, AJP-01(B) includes only three special 
operations tasks: special surveillance and reconnaissance (SSR), direct action (DA), and 
military assistance (MA). The tasks are limited because of the nature of SO in the context 
of allied joint operations. The complete set of NSOF tasks will probably be addressed in 
AJP 3.5. Recalling that the new NATO doctrine for SO is expected to be similar to the 
U.S. Doctrine for Joint SO, the missing NATO SOF tasks from those listed above should 
be: unconventional warfare (UW), counterterrorism (CT), counter-proliferation of WMD, 
civil affairs (CA) operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), and information 
operations (IO).  
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On the other hand, according to the CEDESOF, BSOF conducts the following set 
of SO tasks: direct action, search and rescue, special reconnaissance, psychological 
operations, supporting activities in counter-proliferation of WMD, countering drug and 
arms trafficking, and counterterrorism, civil military cooperation operations, support to 
information operations, and humanitarian operations (2001, p. 10-14). Although it is 
quite a large set of missions, important tasks such as MA and UW are missing in the 
Bulgarian concept for SO; moreover, tasks like UW and CT gained exceptional 
significance after September 11th, 2001. As aforementioned, in 2001, due to the excellent 
utilization of UW, U.S. SOF achieved quick victory over the Taliban regime and al-
Qaeda during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Considering the latest 
developments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the indirect approach for dealing with insurgents 
and terrorists is gaining in importance.  
Recently, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, General 
James Jones, urged Bulgaria to actively participate in NATO operations not with small 
military units under international command, but with larger contingents under Bulgarian 
command (NATO demanded more active Bulgarian participation in the operations of the 
Alliance, 2006). Keeping in mind that the Bulgarian Armed Forces, particularly BSOF, 
should participate with a growing number of units in NATO operations worldwide, tasks 
like MA, UW, and PSYOP should be comprehensively utilized for the complete 
employment of BSOF. The reason for the latter recommendation is that the present 
Bulgarian CEDESOF is limited only to the PSYOP and supporting activities in CT 
operations. Alternatively, as discussed in Chapter III, according to the LTVDBAF, in 
addition to the downsizing of the BSOF Command, the PSYOP battalion is expected to 
be reduced to company size and be shifted away from the BSOF community. Thus, an 
important task in support of indirect special operations will remain without a specialized 
unit to conduct it. On one hand, BSOF are not assigned with missions like UW and FID; 
on the other hand, an important PSYOP unit is shifted away from the Bulgarian Special 
Forces community. All these negative factors conventionalize BSOF, degrading their 
strategic capabilities. Apparently, there is considerable discord not only between the 
Bulgarian CEDESOF and the NATO Doctrine AJP-01 (B), but between the 
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organizational transformation of BSOF and the latest operational requirements for 
employment of SOF against the contemporary threats for both global and Bulgarian 
national security.  
C. SUMMARY 
Considering the nature of the contemporary security environment, Bulgarian 
national security demands new military forces with adjusted operational capabilities. 
Large conventional armies may lose their relevance in favor of smaller, flexible, easy 
deployable, culturally attuned forces with unconventional capabilities. The Bulgarian 
Armed Forces possess such a military asset – BSOF. Moreover, SO might be considered 
a basic military approach for proactive response to asymmetric threats that may endanger 
Bulgarian national security. However, for successful execution of SO, BSOF should meet 
a set of necessary requirements predetermined by the demands of national security and 
NATO regulations. The analysis of how the requirements of Bulgarian national security 
and NATO SOF standards are addressed by BSOF presents a number of substantial 
shortfalls.  
The strategic importance of SO requires compressed and unequivocal C2; 
therefore, BSOF should be placed at the joint level – along with the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force under the command of the GS – which is the most senior military commanding 
organization of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Contrary to that notion, BSOF is 
subordinated to the Army, and its line of C2 is extended and complex. Such C2 
arrangements impede the employment of BSOF against asymmetric threats; thus, 
negatively affecting Bulgarian national security. Moreover, SOF of the three armed 
services are not unified under an independent command, which should exercise unilateral 
command, control, management, and coordination of the subordinated units. The lack of 
a commanding body for all BSOF undermines the jointness of SO and impedes the 
strategic long-range projection and service support for Special Forces. Furthermore, 
BSOF is not provided with an independent funding program; thus, possibly remaining 
inherently undersupplied.  
During deployments for participation in PSO, BSOF are tailored as ad-hoc units 
and are not organized into SOF Task Forces. This pattern of employment of BSOF leads 
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to misusing of its assets and wasting their expertise. Regarding the NATO standards for 
SO determined by AJP-01 (B), the present management of BSOF is in violation of 
general SO principles. Moreover, the SO tasks outlined in the Bulgarian CEDESOF do 
not address important missions such as FID and UW, and CT is mentioned as a collateral 
task. Alternatively, PSYOP is a core task, but, due to the latest reorganizations, there are 
no units available to conduct this mission. All aforementioned shortfalls detrimentally 
affect not only BSOF, but also undermine national security and military strategies as well 
as the NATO membership of the Republic of Bulgaria. Therefore, an updated conception 
for management, C2, and utilization of BSOF should be proposed to the Bulgarian 
politico-military leadership. The suggested model for future BSOF must completely 












Bulgarian national security is a naturally critical factor for the progressive 
development of the state and the well-being of its citizens. The political and military 
leadership is responsible for making decisions for Bulgarian security while appropriately 
addressing the challenges of both current and future threats. The most considerable risks 
for Bulgarian national security today are terrorism, rise of radical Islamism, illegal 
transportation of nuclear weapons and WMD, ethnic crises in the Balkan region, 
organized crime and its possible symbiosis with terrorism, and illegal trafficking of 
people, drugs, and weapons (ANSR, 2006). Most of these threats are considered 
asymmetric. The geo-strategic location of Bulgaria as a crossroad between three 
continents – Europe, Africa, and Asia – and the Black Sea coast facilitates the 
development of the aforementioned risks. Moreover, Bulgaria is already a part of NATO 
and on January 1st, 2007, it will be a member of the European Union. The state actively 
participates in the global war on terror with military units in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Supporting the agendas of these global political, military, and economic organizations, 
the state may well be considered a high-profile target not only for terrorist and radical 
Islamic organizations but also for international organized crime. Therefore, Bulgarian 
national security could face considerable challenges, and the Bulgarian leadership bears 
growing responsibility caused by the participation in the aforementioned organizations. 
As part of the security arsenal of the state, particularly the armed forces, BSOF should be 
ready to address both conventional military and irregular asymmetric threats and defend 
Bulgarian national security.  
Alternatively, the probability for large-scale wars between conventional national 
armies in the region has decreased. Therefore, Bulgarian defense policy has been 
modified to develop military capabilities – that already exist in BSOF – in response to 
crises or contingencies different from conventional wars. The transformed armed forces 
will likely be comprised of “combat-efficient, multipurpose, relatively self-sufficient, 
properly equipped, and highly mobile military units with joint capabilities for deployment 
domestically or abroad” (ANSR, 2006). Most of these requirements fit the characteristics 
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of the BSOF – professional, flexible, mobile, specially equipped, interoperable, and 
maintaining the highest operational readiness (CEDESOF, 2000, p. 8). This similarity 
emphasizes the growing relevance of BSOF as a military guardian of Bulgarian national 
security, as it is indirectly stated by the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine, 
and the Military Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria.  Furthermore, considering the 
NATO partnership of Bulgaria, its armed forces, particularly BSOF, must address the 
military standards of the Alliance.   
SOF is inherently designed to support or lead both armed forces and law-
enforcement agencies in peace and war. It should be capable of supporting conventional 
and conducting special (unconventional) military operations. With its unique military 
expertise, means for strategic projection, communications, and support, SOF possesses 
the potential to assist and complement the operational limitations of law-enforcement 
agencies against terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons and WMD, and other non-
military contingencies. All these peculiarities define SOF as a valuable military asset 
capable of conducting operations with politico-military relevance in response to the 
external or internal challenges posed by the contemporary risks for the security of a state. 
Moreover, if properly tailored, employed, and equipped, SOF can operate within its own 
territory or abroad; thus, complementing the operational limitations of the conventional 
forces and civilian law-enforcement agencies.  
However, recalling the previously identified shortfalls of BSOF, the question is 
whether the Bulgarian military leadership underestimates the utility of this asset and the 
benefits of its proper development and employment. The answer may be found in certain 
bureaucratic organizational biases within the Bulgarian military. The inter-service rivalry 
among the military organizations for scarce resources and bureaucratic dominance is 
another factor that may negatively affect BSOF. Usually, the politicians are advised by 
military experts on specific issues related to the defense of the state, but some proposed 
solutions are likely to support the organizational interest of a particular armed service 
and, consequently, not the requirements of Bulgarian national security. In the context of 
his Organizational Behavior Model, Graham Allison observes the same phenomenon:  
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“…The drives for efficiency and identity in organizational logic highlights instances 
when this logic of appropriateness produces behavior at odds with actions states should 
rationally have chosen…” (1999, p. 159).  
Some might think that the problem is the inherited military culture of the Warsaw 
Pact. But prior to 2001, BSOF was actually subordinated to the General Staff; therefore, 
the likely reason for its present organizational grievances is embedded in the 
organizational interests of the armed services. Once the Army has achieved control over 
BSOF, it will be very difficult for conventional commanders to give away this most 
capable military organization. Keeping BSOF under the Army's control is justified by the 
opportunity for acquiring additional relatively scarce resources and expanding the 
conventional hierarchy and influence. Moreover, the Bulgarian armed services are in 
permanent bureaucratic confrontation; therefore, the emergence of a new service 
organization could further threaten their bureaucratic interests. In addition to that, 
conventional commanders have always been envious of elite forces. This is why BSOF 
have been negatively influenced by the conventional leadership of the Bulgarian Armed 
Forces.  
Furthermore, NATO closely monitors the reforms in the Bulgarian Armed Forces, 
but its representatives still only diplomatically urge the Bulgarian politico-military 
leadership to implement the allied standards to BSOF. Probably in the recent future 
NATO will take a firmer position on this issue, especially regarding the approved  
Bulgaria Forces Goals related to the military integration of the Bulgarian Armed Forces. 
Although NATO encourages the Bulgarian military leadership to transform BSOF 
according to allied standards, it still respects the national position on BSOF. 
Alternatively, if the Bulgarian Armed Forces fail to address the allied requirements for 
interoperability, it could seriously endanger Bulgarian membership in NATO. Therefore, 
for being a capable guardian of Bulgarian national security and a credible military asset 
of NATO, BSOF should be tailored and managed in response to the challenges of the 




A. SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Required Organizational Design, C2, and Support for BSOF 
BSOF should be a military asset capable of responding to crises with political and 
strategic relevance. As discussed in the previous chapter, its position in the military 
hierarchy of the Bulgarian Armed Forces as an Army subordinated asset violates the 
principle of special operations for a compressed and unequivocal line of C2. Although a 
need has not occurred yet, it could be very difficult for BSOF to be utilized in short 
notice and in a proactive manner in response to a challenge to Bulgarian national 
security. This limitation contradicts the security requirements of the NSC and the MS. 
Moreover, SOF of the armed services are not organized under a unified command, which 
decreases the efficiency of their C2 and joint operational capabilities. Present 
organizational arrangements complicate the provision of BSOF with strategic projection 
assets, combat service, and logistic support from the armed services. Furthermore, as a 
military service's subordinated organization, BSOF is vulnerable to the inter-service 
political rivalry and may easily be deprived of finances for obtaining modern weapons 
and special equipment. Although the funds for SOF are a small fraction of the overall 
military budget, superior military organizations often consider their own needs a priority. 
That is why BSOF is threatened to remain financially underprovided and inherently 
undersupplied with essential special equipment. Likewise, this was true of U.S. SOF: 
But almost all of the elite units . . . faced considerable bureaucratic 
hostility-enmity translated into effective harassment. Even when backed 
by top political leaders, elite units were restrained by petty maneuvers 
such as withholding of recruits or supplies. Bureaucratic hostility operated 
in more subtle ways as well-the regular civilian and military bureaucracies 
stigmatized elite units. This was particularly true in the case of the Special 
Forces… (Cohen, 1978, p. 95) 
All these shortfalls greatly diminish the operational capabilities of BSOF and may 
negatively affect Bulgarian national security. 
Therefore, Bulgarian Special Operations Forces of all armed services should be 
unified under a single command directly subordinated to the top military commanding 
organization of the Bulgarian Armed Forces – the General Staff – as it was before 2001. 
The unified BSOF Command should provide a compressed and unequivocal line of C2 
 71
from the highest politico-military authority to the lowest SOF unit assigned to conduct a 
particular SO. BSOF senior representatives should participate in the joint centralized 
planning of an operation, while the decentralized and detailed planning, coordination, and 
execution of an individual SO should be a responsibility of the BSOF Command.  
To facilitate an effective long-range projection in response to military or 
asymmetric contingencies, BSOF should be provided with its own or subordinated aerial 
and maritime assets. Moreover, the successful accomplishment of a SO is facilitated by 
the latest military and civilian technological inventions; therefore, BSOF should be 
provided with an independent funding program in order to easily be supplied with the 
most effective and advanced weapons, communication assets, and special equipment. 
During deployments under the command of a senior Bulgarian or international 
conventional component or independently, BSOF should participate with a SO task force 
comprised of a HQ element and organic SOF units. This set of requirements is a 
necessary prerequisite for BSOF to be an effective special military asset and a valuable 
tool in support of Bulgarian national security.  
2. Implementation of NATO Standards  
NATO membership is a substantial factor for Bulgarian national security. 
Bulgaria is an integral part of the defense system of the Alliance, and as such, it should 
receive and provide security in the context of Article 5. For the successful 
implementation of the defense strategy of NATO, all its members should achieve full 
operational interoperability through the adoption of allied military standards. In that 
respect, BSOF should be reorganized in accordance with the requirements stated in 
Chapter 8 of the Allied Joint Doctrine (AJP)-01 (B). The aforementioned 
recommendations for improvement of BSOF in accordance with the requirements of 
Bulgarian national security coincide with the basic principles and standards for SO in 
AJP-01 (B). This concurrence proves the relevancy of the latter suggestions in regards to 
BSOF and Bulgarian national security. One of the discords between the Bulgarian 
CEDESOF and NATO doctrine is the SO missions. Although the list of SO tasks in AJP-
01 (B) is shorter than the number of Bulgarian Special Operations, it still contains a task 
such as military assistance. Alternatively, the Bulgarian concept provides a variety of 
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tasks, but essential SO missions such as military assistance, unconventional warfare, and 
counterterrorism are either missing or barely referred to.  
For an effective membership in NATO, the Bulgarian military leadership should 
encourage the development of a new SO doctrine. The doctrine should be adjusted in 
accordance with the SO standards of the Alliance, and it is recommended that the set of 
SO tasks be comprised of unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, special surveillance 
and reconnaissance, direct action, military assistance or foreign internal defense, counter-
proliferation of WMD, civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and information 
operations. Contrary to the latest organizational changes in the Bulgarian Armed Forces, 
BSOF should develop and maintain a number of units for unconventional warfare, 
military assistance, psychological operations and civil affairs operations. These tasks 
represent a critical military approach for dealing with contemporary asymmetric threats; 
moreover, they could be utilized as an essential national lever for indirect, high or low-
profile politico-military influence in the interest of protecting Bulgarian national security. 
Through implementation of all these recommendations imposed by the requirements of 
Bulgarian National Security and Military Strategies and NATO standards, BSOF can be a 
viable military asset for addressing the challenges facing Bulgarian national security and 
the defense concerns of NATO. Apparently, Bulgaria needs SOF that possesses the 
following capabilities: 
Special operations forces (SOF) have proven invaluable over past decades 
and have become indispensable in the post-9/11 security environment. 
They can be used to prevent terrorist attacks, rescue hostages, train foreign 
forces for unconventional operations, seize critical facilities, scout in 
hostile territory and forbidding terrain, and pave the way for intervention 
by regular forces. Such versatility is possible because SOF combine 
physical fighting prowess with technological dexterity. They can use 
lasers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and global positioning system 
devices to spot enemy targets and then transmit the data to precision-strike 
air forces. SOF units are light, lethal, small, mobile, and easily networked 
with other forces. In addition, SOF are uncommonly enterprising and 
adaptable—important qualities in these fluid and unpredictable times 
(Gompert & Smith, 2006, p. 1). 
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B. THE WAY AHEAD – WHAT NEXT? 
The proposed solutions and recommendations contained herein are vital for the 
survival of BSOF as a capable military asset for Bulgarian national security. Such 
arrangements intertwine the lessons learned from the long historic experience of SOF 
worldwide and the latest military organizational, operational, and technological 
achievements adopted by NATO. Considering the proposed changes and by 
implementing them to BSOF, the Bulgarian politico-military leadership will have the 
opportunity to test the utility of such an approach. Although national peculiarities matter 
and should be considered, the suggested model for BSOF will be successful only if the 
proposed solutions are fully implemented. Furthermore, the reform of BSOF should be 
encouraged and supported by the political and military leadership of Bulgaria; otherwise, 
the bureaucratic influence of the involved military organizations may halt and even 
terminate the suggested military reforms in case they are approved by the politicians. The 
history of U.S. SOF presents such an example:  
. . . [D]eclaring policy – even when it has the force of law – does not 
ensure its successful or sustainable implementation. The campaign for 
SOF reform that culminated in the special operations forces reorganization 
legislation had not yet built the strong special operations capability… 
USSOCOM and the OASD (SOLIC) would take years to become mature 
and thriving organization. Most important, it would take nearly four years 
of “peacetime arrangement” within the Defense Department before the 
commander in chief of USSOCOM would have the checkbook that would 
give the SOF autonomy intended by Congress and necessary to secure its 
future (Marquis, 1997, p. 268).   
The transformation of BSOF is an important part of the politico-military activities 
in support of Bulgarian national security. Moreover, Special Forces possess capabilities 
that can not be developed in the short run. The expertise for long-range reconnaissance, 
direct action, subversion, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, military assistance, 
psychological and civil affairs operations requires exceptional military professionalism, 
broad cultural awareness, language skills, and mature experience that requires a long time 
to be obtained. Therefore, the already developed capabilities by BSOF should be 
preserved and further elaborated by implementing the proposed reforms. The prolonging 
of this process will negatively affect not only the potential of BSOF but also Bulgarian 
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national security. The historic experience and evolution of U.S. SOF identified the 
following principle truths for special operations forces: 
• Humans are more important than hardware. 
• Quality is better than quantity. 
• Special operations forces cannot be massed produced. 
• Competent special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies 
arise (JP 3-05, 2003, p. II-4). 
 
In the future, BSOF should be appropriately organized, trained and equipped in 
order to be a significant military pillar for Bulgarian national security. BSOF should be 
utilized as a cost-effective, high or low-profile, and greatly efficient asset for defending 
the strategic interests of the state. Moreover, BSOF should be encouraged to develop 
plans against high-value and critical for national security targets, and the suggested 
operations should be respectfully considered by the Bulgarian politico-military 
leadership. The underestimation of the recommendations provided by U.S. SOF for 
protection of U.S. national security might have been one of the factors which facilitated 
the September 11Pth P, 2001 terrorist attack. Congressman Curt Weldon, a senior member of 
the House Armed Services Committee, testified before the House of Representatives 
eight months after  9/11: 
One year before 9/11, the capability that Special Forces built actually 
identified to us the network of al-Qaeda. … And they went beyond that 
and gave us recommendations where we could take out cells to eliminate 
their capability. All that activity could have prevented or help to prevent 
9/11 from ever occurring (Verton, 2003, p. 169).   
As a final, but no less important controversy is the organizational culture of SOF.  
Mavericks, critical thinkers, individuals who are capable of 
conceptualizing innovative tactics, equipment and methodologies that are 
alien to the conventional wisdom were, and still are, often marginalized. 
Yet, their ideas and contributions, once properly harnessed and allowed to 
flourish, provide incredible payback. This is the strength of SOF (Horn, 
2005). 
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BSOF is a military organization which differs from the other services, just like the Army, 
Air Force, and Navy are distinctive in the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Its cultural 
characteristics are predetermined by the unique nature of the unconventional employment 
of SOF units.  The successful execution of SO is not defined only by technical 
operational details and routine training, but also by flexibility, improvisation, and “out-
of-the-box” thinking. Therefore, SOF commanders usually do not impose the type of 
discipline and subordination peculiar to conventional forces, thus encouraging 
unorthodox ideas. Marquis found that “[t]he critical values of independence, 
unconventional thinking, and near equality among the members of the small operational 
teams are often in direct conflict with the values of conventional military forces” (1997, 
p. 8). The traditions and peculiarities of BSOF create its unique organizational image; 
that is why it should be understood, accepted, and appreciated by both the military and 
political leadership of Bulgaria. 
C. NECESSITY FOR FUTURE STUDIES 
This study lays the basis of an academic discussion on the management and 
utilization of BSOF. Regrettably, this scholastic glance based on the available open 
sources referring to BSOF capabilities, the requirements of Bulgarian national security, 
and NATO standards has identified significant shortfalls. Therefore a set of 
recommendations for the improvement of BSOF has been put forth. The analysis and 
proposed recommendations may be limited, but they constitute one of the possible 
solutions for the future development of BSOF. How valuable these proposals are may 
only become clear if they are fully implemented by the Bulgarian politico-military 
leadership.  
On the other hand, the Bulgarian government is developing a new Bulgarian 
National Security Strategy, which is expected to be released in 2007, and as previously 
mentioned, NATO is creating a new Doctrine for Special Operations – AJP 3.5. 
Concurrently, the Bulgarian military is also working on a Doctrine for Special 
Operations.  In the near future, numerous changes and developments related to SOF will 
occur in NATO and Bulgaria. Therefore, further studies according to the developed 
doctrines and the proposed changes will be required. The significance of this topic is not 
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accidental. It is inspired not only by the need for change in BSOF, but also by the 
necessity for enhancing Bulgarian national and global security in response to 
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